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Spatial econometrics is a subfield of econometrics that deals with the treatment of spatial 
interactions in regression models for cross sectional and panel data.  
 
Chapter 1: This is the first paper that highlights the role of spatial interactions, in the 
context of bankruptcy laws, in the entrepreneurship decision. This chapter is in two parts: 
one of which relates to the birth, and the other to the death, of businesses. The focus of 
the paper is on small businesses in the US. Small firms represent more than 90% of all 
enterprises and play a large role in entry and exit in the US.  Further, the US has 
traditionally had pro-debtor bankruptcy laws. Hence this paper asks whether laws that 
facilitate easy exit, such as bankruptcy laws, are an important consideration in entry (and 
exit) of small businesses. This paper studies the decision of an entrepreneur to begin (or 
end) a business in a particular state, as a function of bankruptcy regulations and other 
business variables in that state as well as those in neighboring states. The study uses 
longitudinal household level data from the SIPP (Census) dataset. I estimate a random 
 effects probit model with a lagged endogenous variable. The paper finds that higher 
bankruptcy exemptions in neighboring states lower the probability of starting a business 
in the state of residence. The bankruptcy exemption in one's own state has a significant 
and positive impact on entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Chapter II: This paper is a first attempt to empirically model determinants of FDI flows 
to emerging market economies, using a spatial approach. The paper uses data on FDI 
inflows to 29 emerging market and developing economies for the period 1980-2000. 
Apart from various country characteristics, we include a corruption perception index and 
an index of labor productivity as determinants of these flows. The unique contribution of 
this paper is to include a weighted average of these conditions in “neighbor countries” 
amongst factors that may explain FDI flows into a country. Results indicate that 
corruption perception and labor productivity, in both host and neighbor countries, 
significantly determine FDI inflows to a host country.  
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Chapter 1 
A Spatial Model of the Impact of Bankruptcy Law on Entrepreneurship1 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of bankruptcy law on births and closures of small 
businesses. The paper asks whether laws that facilitate easy exit are an important 
consideration in entry of small firms. The reason why we study small firms is that the 
OECD Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Outlook 2002 reports that SMEs represent 
between 96%-99% of all enterprises in most OECD economies. The rates of gross job 
creation and destruction are highest among small firms. Haltiwanger, Davis and Schuh 
(1993) find that the rate of gross job creation in US manufacturing is nearly double for 
firms with less than 100 employees as compared to firms with more than 25000 
employees. However, there is no clear relationship between net job creation rates and 
firm size, since small firms destroy a disproportionately large share of existing jobs.2 
Thus small businesses are responsible for much of the “churning” or turnover in the US 
                                                 
1 I wish to express my gratitude to my advisors Prof. Harry Kelejian and Prof. John Shea. I wish to thank 
Prof. Ginger Jin and Prof. Gelbach for their advice and comments. Thanks also to Kartikeya Singh, Dr. 
Devesh Roy and seminar participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference, Chicago, and the 
AEA Meetings (2005) for useful comments.  All errors are mine. The research was funded by the Small 
Business Administration and was conducted while the author was a student at the University of Maryland, 
College Park.  
 
 
2 Between 1990 to 1995, 90.1% of the 371,547 net new establishments in the US were small firms (less 
than 500 employees), and very small firms (less than 20 employees) accounted for 68.4% of these. During 
the same period, small firms created 76.5% of the 6.85 million net new jobs, while the very small firms 
created 49%. 
 
 
2 
economy. Overall from 1989 to 1995, 2.9 million small firms were born, and 2.6 million 
small firms died.3 In Europe, too, employment growth is strongest in small enterprises.4 
 
 Small firms play a large role in entry and exit in the OECD economies. If we define 
overall job turnover as the sum of openings and expansions, plus contractions and 
shutdowns, then another interesting finding emerges. As the OECD Jobs Study (1995) 
reports, openings account for the majority of job gains in the US while closures account 
for the majority of job losses. In other OECD economies, like Italy and Germany, 
however, the majority of job creation and destruction is accounted for by expansion and 
contraction of existing establishments. This finding is documented by Bartelsmann, 
Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003) as well, who find that entry rates in the US are 
significantly higher than entry rates in Germany and Italy, while entry rates for small 
firms (less than 20 employees) are significantly higher than for other size classes of 
firms. 
 
A question that arises therefore is whether laws that determine the costs and benefits of 
exit, such as bankruptcy laws, are important to entry of small businesses. The US is 
unusual in having very pro-debtor bankruptcy laws. For example, while US bankruptcy 
law provides for discharge of debts of failed businesses when the business owner files for 
bankruptcy, German bankruptcy law does not. The owner of a failed business in 
                                                 
3 Small Business Growth by Major Industry (SBA) 
 
 
4 The report of the European Observatory on SMEs (No.7, 2003) cites country studies by Gallagher and 
Stewart (UK,1986), Heshmati (Sweden, 2001) and Hohti (Finland, 2000), which suggest that small firm 
dynamics are similar to the US in European economies, and in some countries like Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland, there is a similar negative link between gross job creation rates and firm size. 
3 
Germany who files for bankruptcy continues to be liable for the business' debts and can 
be forced to repay these debts from future earnings for many years after filing.5 The 
differential impact of bankruptcy law is evident from the fact that among the 
industrialized countries, only the US has a high and rapidly rising bankruptcy filing rate.6 
 
The focus of this paper is on US personal bankruptcy law. The US personal bankruptcy 
system functions as a bankruptcy system for small unincorporated businesses as well as 
consumers. If a firm fails, the entrepreneur has an incentive to file for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7, since both business debts and the entrepreneur’s personal debts are discharged. 
The entrepreneur must give up assets above a fixed bankruptcy exemption level for 
repayment to creditors. However, future earnings are entirely exempt.7  
 
These bankruptcy exemption levels are set by the states and vary widely across states and 
over time. Thus the US provides a natural panel to analyze the impact of bankruptcy law 
on entrepreneurship. The effect of high exemptions, as documented in the literature, is 
two-fold. Fan and White (2003) have shown that the wealth insurance effect of 
exemptions encourages entrepreneurship, while Berkowitz and White (2004) find that 
small firms are more likely to be denied credit if they are located in states with unlimited 
exemptions. My results confirm those of Fan and White (2003),  that even if credit access 
                                                 
5 This is true even for corporations. 
 
 
6 Fan and White (2003) 
 
 
7 Proposed changes in the law (Bills HR333 and S420) make it harder for individuals above a certain 
median income to file for bankruptcy, and cap the maximum exemption limit. Only wage earners whose 
household incomes are below their state's median (the U.S. median for a family of four was recently 
$59,981) will be permitted to file under Chapter 7. 
4 
is tougher, entrepreneurs would prefer to be in states with high, rather than low 
exemptions. 
 
The unique contribution of this paper is that it studies the effect of bankruptcy law in a 
spatial setting, whereby entrepreneurs are seen to be choosing the optimal location of 
their business from a choice of locations including one’s own and neighboring states. 
Their decision to start (or end) the business is therefore a function of business conditions 
in these competing locations. Introducing spatial effects is not without basis. Holmes 
(1998), Karvel, Musil and Sebastian (2002) and other authors provide evidence that 
business relocation decisions could be prompted by competing business conditions in 
neighboring states. In the dataset that I use, I find cases in which of all individuals who 
had relocated to other states, about 1% started businesses in these new states. I also find 
cases in which entrepreneurs who had shut down their business in a particular state, 
sometimes moved to another state, and started a business there.8  
 
 I make use of detailed longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) that tracks individuals over a period of three years and has monthly 
information on labor force characteristics, state of residence and demographic 
characteristics. Hence I am able to know the exact location of the individual at the time of 
                                                 
8 On average per year, about 1.5% of the sample changed states. Out of these, approximately .4% (less 
than 1%) started businesses, and conditional on moving and starting a business, nearly 55% had moved 
to a higher exemption state. Further, data on why businesses ended is only available for the period 
1996-98. Out of all closures per year, nearly 2% were due to filing for bankruptcy. Other reasons for 
shutting down businesses were restarting another business or taking up a job, and nearly 4% of 
businesses closed for this reason. Of the businesses that closed and restarted, nearly 3% restarted in a 
new state with higher exemptions.  
 
 
5 
starting (or ending) a business. That further allows me to use state business conditions, 
such as the bankruptcy exemption level, as factors affecting the transition to 
entrepreneurship.  
 
The paper finds that higher bankruptcy exemptions in neighboring states lower the 
probability of starting a business in the state of residence. The bankruptcy exemption in 
one's own state has a significant and positive impact on entrepreneurship.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview of the study. 
Section 2 provides a literature review and evidence for spatial effects. Section 3 develops 
a theoretical model, and provides details of the empirical methodology. Section 4 
provides results for business starts and closures. Section 5 outlines different 
specifications and Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.1.1 Overview 
 
In this paper, I propose a two-part study. The first part of the paper will focus on job 
creation through the birth of small businesses. The second will focus on job destruction 
through the death of small businesses. In particular, I look at the decision of a cross 
sectional unit (an individual or a family) to either begin or end a business in a particular 
state, as a function of bankruptcy regulations and other business and macroeconomic 
variables in that state as well as those in neighboring states. I propose to expand upon 
models in the literature, most notably Fan and White (2003), in a number of ways. First, I 
6 
will allow for spatial interactions. There has been no paper to my knowledge that has 
looked at spillover effects from adjoining states on the probability of starting or ending a 
business in a particular state. I believe that these effects are important, since individuals 
have the option to move and locate their businesses in states that offer better conditions, 
such as higher exemptions or lower tax rates9. To allow for these interactions, I will 
introduce a weighting matrix that puts a positive weight on business conditions in 
adjoining states. We expect that the probability of starting (ending) a business in a 
particular state is inversely (directly) related to business conditions in adjoining states. 
 
Second, I will be using additional variables that have not been considered in previous 
literature. To the extent that some individuals move from unemployment to starting a 
business, policies relating to the level of unemployment benefits will also be important. 
Self-Employment Assistance programs for people receiving unemployment benefits vary 
by state and may also play a role in an individual’s decision to start a business in a 
particular state.10 Finally, I examine if the cost of health insurance for the entrepreneur 
has an impact on the decision to start a business.  
 
                                                 
9 I assume that individuals start or end businesses in the state in which they reside at the beginning of the 
year. 
 
 
10 Self-Employment Assistance programs offer dislocated workers the opportunity for early re-employment. 
The program is designed to encourage and enable unemployed workers to create their own jobs by starting 
their own small businesses. Under these programs, States can pay a self-employed allowance, instead of 
regular unemployment insurance benefits, to help unemployed workers while they are establishing 
businesses and becoming self-employed. This is a voluntary program for States and, to date, fewer than 10 
States have established and currently operate Self Employment Assistance programs. (Source: US 
Department of Labor)  
 
 
7 
Third, my study is based on Survey of Income and Program Participation data relating to 
two panels: 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. In future drafts, I intend to extend the paper by 
using data relating to the period 1983-85. In 1978, a new Federal Bankruptcy code 
allowed each US state to set its own bankruptcy exemption level, which they all did by 
1982. It may be interesting to look at 1983 data to see the immediate impact of these 
exemptions on individual decisions to start or end a business.11 Moreover, by pooling 
data for these years with that for 1993-98, I get more variation in state policies over time. 
 
My formulation of the model allows for state dummies and individual random effects. I 
specifically test to see whether the state dummies are significant. My formulation of the 
model has a richer set of observable state level variables than other studies to fully 
capture all of the state level effects. Fan and White (2003) in their panel data model 
considered only a random effects specification. They did not include state dummies, and 
did not test to see if their observable state variables were sufficient to capture all the state 
effects.   
 
Finally, I introduce a lagged dependent variable to control for the possibility that 
individuals who owned (or did not own) a business in the past may be more likely to start 
(end) a business today.  
 
The contribution of the paper is also methodological. As described in detail in Appendix 
A.1, the estimation of a probit model containing random effects, a lagged dependent 
variable and state dummies, with a large number of cross sectional units and a relatively 
                                                 
11 If possible, I will try to obtain data for before 1978, and see if results are significantly different. 
8 
short time dimension, requires special manipulations and programs for empirical 
implementation. In particular, separately identifying the effect of the lagged dependent 
variable and unobserved heterogeneity (the random effect) requires modeling of initial 
conditions, which further complicates the estimation procedure. None of the papers 
surveyed here have introduced all of these features in a single model. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
In this section, I will review some of the theoretical and empirical literature that has 
researched the role of various demographic, human capital, and financial considerations 
in the decision to become an entrepreneur. Most previous studies have examined the 
importance of the earnings differential between entrepreneurship and paid employment, 
taxation, liquidity constraints, and intergenerational transfers. As this review shows, there 
has been relatively little research on the role of bankruptcy law as an important factor in 
spawning innovation and employment, and further, there has been no paper, to our 
knowledge, that has used a spatial econometric model to study the same. 
 
 There have been two papers of note that have looked at the role of bankruptcy 
exemptions. The first is Fan and White (2003) and the other is Georgellis and Wall 
(2002). Fan and White (2003) consider the impact on entrepreneurial activity of 
bankruptcy exemptions, along with other variables that have been used extensively in the 
literature. They find a significant and positive relationship between the probability of 
starting a business and the exemption level. The probability of starting a business rises by 
about 22% from the lowest exemption states to the highest exemption states. Their results 
9 
also suggest that the probability of ending a business is higher in states with high 
bankruptcy exemption levels, increasing by about 18% between the lowest exemption 
states and the unlimited exemption states. However the coefficients on the exemption 
variables in the case for ending a business are not statistically significant. As pointed out 
before,  Fan and White (2003) do not consider spatial effects. For instance, if neighboring 
states have higher exemptions, this may influence a family’s decision to start or end a 
business in their own state. They also did not test to see if state fixed effects are 
important. In my model I find that including the spatial exemption variables causes the 
own exemption to become insignificant. Hence what appears to be important is not the 
exemption level per se, but the own exemption relative to neighbor exemptions. 
 
Georgellis and Wall (2002) do not look at micro data on individuals or families. Instead 
they define the rate of entrepreneurship in a state as the proportion of the working age 
population that is classified as non-farm proprietors. They regress this on state policy 
measures, controlling for state and time dummies and for measures of business and 
demographic conditions, using US state panel data for 1991-98. The business condition 
measures include the state’s unemployment rate, per capita real income and industry 
employment shares. The policy measures include the maximum marginal tax rate and the 
bankruptcy homestead exemption. The results indicate that at very low and high initial 
levels, an increase in the homestead exemption reduces the number of entrepreneurs. In 
the mid-range of homestead exemption rates, there is a positive relationship between the 
exemption level and entrepreneurship. Further, only for relatively high homestead 
exemption rates will the level of entrepreneurship be higher than if there were no 
10 
exemption at all. This result is different from that of Fan and White (2003), who find the 
relationship between the exemption level and homeowners’ probability of owning a 
business to be monotonically increasing. Georgellis and Wall (2002) also find significant 
state fixed effects. Since their paper deals with data aggregated at the state level, 
Georgellis and Wall are unable to analyze factors that may be more relevant at the 
individual level, such as family wealth, the age of the entrepreneur and so on. Moreover, 
even at the macro level, they do not consider factors such as the percentage of union 
workers in each state, which I incorporate. 12 
 
Other papers in this literature test for liquidity constraints, controlling for macroeconomic 
variables. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, Rosen (1994), Evans and Leighton (1989) and Evans 
and Jovanovic (1989) find that higher inheritances and liquid assets increase the 
likelihood of entrepreneurship.  Another strand of research has focused on the differential 
tax treatment of income earned while working for others versus income from self-
employment. Some noteworthy papers include Cullen and Gordon (2002) and Bruce 
(1998), who find a positive relationship between personal tax rates and entrepreneurship. 
The role of race and work history has also been considered in the literature on self-
employment. Meyer (1990) and Blanchflower and Meyer (1992) find that blacks are 
significantly less likely to be self-employed than whites, while older, married, male 
workers are more likely to be self-employed. Moreover, Evans and Leighton (1989) 
conclude that people who have had low earnings in the past or who have shorter job 
tenures are also more likely to be self-employed. 
                                                 
12 Previous research has shown that the probability of moving from a wage and salary occupation to owning 
a business is lower for union members (Bruce, 1998). 
11 
 
There are other papers that have looked specifically at the factors leading to closure of 
businesses. These are very similar to factors that are significant for starting businesses, 
such as availability of financial capital, human capital in the form of skills of the 
entrepreneur and the relative attractiveness of being a wage earner versus owning a 
business.  Kangasharju and Pekkala (2001) find that firms run by more educated 
individuals have a higher probability of survival. Also, the probability of exit is lower for 
firms run by more educated individuals during recessions, but higher during booms. One 
reason for this may be that highly educated individuals face a higher outside demand for 
their labor during economic upturns than less educated individuals. In another paper, 
Pfeiffer and Reize (1998) find that firm survival rates are lower if a previously 
unemployed individual founded the firm. None of these papers have looked at the role of 
bankruptcy exemptions, and they do not consider the role of regional differences and 
spatial interactions in determining this probability. 
 
1.2.1 Evidence for Spatial Effects 
 
The Census Bureau (2000) report on state-to-state migration flows between 1995-2000 
finds that the largest migrations were to adjacent or nearby states. For instance, Arizona’s 
largest migration inflow was from California and its largest outflow was to California. 
Similarly, there were large flows between New York and New Jersey, California and 
Nevada, and so on. A Goldwater Policy Institute Report (2004) further finds in census 
data that states with the highest total tax burdens suffered a net loss of more than 
12 
1,700,000 residents between 1995 and 2000 and that business climate significantly 
influenced millions of household decisions to move across state lines during the 1990s. 
 
 Moreover, Elul and Subramanian (1999) find that considerations of bankruptcy laws 
influence interstate migration. They estimate that roughly 1% of moves to states with 
higher exemption limits are motivated by considerations of differences in bankruptcy 
laws. They state that these figures are roughly the magnitude of the estimates obtained by 
other authors for welfare related migration. 
 
Karvel, Musil and Sebastian (1998) studied business out migration from Minnesota. Of 
the 183 firms surveyed, eighty-two (44.8 percent) went to Wisconsin, forty-six (25.1 
percent) went to South Dakota, thirty-four (18.6) percent went to North Dakota, and 
twenty-one (11.5 percent) went to Iowa. Business taxation (workers’ compensation rates, 
commercial-industrial property taxes, corporate income taxes, and sales taxes) constituted 
the primary reason for relocation. Local and state government incentives from 
neighboring states comprised the next most important reason for business out migration 
decisions, while the absence of Minnesota state and local government incentives to 
compete in retaining or expanding businesses were the third most important set of reasons 
for the respondents’ decisions to leave Minnesota.  Karvel et al (1998) also cite a 
previous small-scale study carried out by the Center for Business Research, which 
examined a single border city—Hudson, Wisconsin. Hudson was selected because it was 
known that a number of Minnesota businesses had relocated or started businesses there. 
The major finding of the Hudson study was that the two most important reasons for 
13 
locating a business in Hudson rather than Minnesota were high workers’ compensation 
rates and commercial-industrial property taxes in Minnesota.  
 
Finally, Holmes (1998) provides evidence that state policies play a role in the location of 
industry. The paper classifies a state as pro-business or anti-business depending on 
whether or not the state has a right-to-work law. The paper finds that on average there is a 
large abrupt increase in manufacturing activity when crossing a border from an anti-
business state into a pro-business state. Other papers, like Glaeser (2001) and Brueckner 
(1999), also study the effect of business incentives, such as taxes, on location decisions 
by firms. None of these papers use spatial modeling in the analysis. 
 
1.3 Details of Study 
 
1.3.1 Theoretical Model 
 
In this section, I develop a theoretical model for my study, which uses the basic 
framework in Fan and White (2003) as a starting point. However, unlike that paper, this 
model considers business conditions in neighboring states and demand conditions. The 
model analyses an individual considering whether to start up a new business in the home 
state, h, or to locate in another, neighboring state, n. Production costs are assumed to be 
the same in each location. We assume, however, that there is a cost of moving from the 
home state to the neighboring state, which is proportional to the distance moved. 
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There are two periods. In period 1, the individual invests in a project that has a cost of I. 
The potential entrepreneur’s initial wealth is given by W, which he invests in the project 
in period 1, and he incurs a fixed amount of debt B>0. The debt is unsecured, has an 
interest rate ri (where i indexes the state), and is due in period 2. The return on the project 
is realized in period 2 and is uncertain at the time of investment due to uncertain demand 
conditions in period 2. The inverse demand function for period 2 is given by 
 
p2i = a-bq2i+u2i    i=h,n u2i ~f(u) (3.1.1) 
 
Where pi and qi denote price and quantity in location i, a is a positive constant, and  
u є [u , u ] is a stochastic demand component. f(u) is the density of u2i , with E[u]=0 and 
var[u]=v. We assume that the moving decision is made prior to the realization of demand 
shock, u. We also allow that u<Xi, where Xi is the bankruptcy exemption in state i. 
The cost of production is given by  
 
C2i = cq2i     i=h,n   (3.1.2) 
Firms will not produce if cp i <2 .13 
Let π2i = (a-bq2i+u2i -c)q2i  denote the level of profits.    (3.1.3) 
 
The value of q2i that maximizes this profit function is given by 
2
i2*
2
cua
q i
−+=                    (3.1.3a) 
                                                 
13 We assume a profit maximizing entrepreneur. 
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This is monotonically increasing in u2i. 
 
If the entrepreneur files for bankruptcy then the debt of B(1+ri) will be discharged but he 
has to give up all assets above the fixed exemption limit Xi, as repayment to creditors.14  
Let 
 
θi = W-I+B+πi-fdi       (3.1.4) 
 
represent the realized gross wealth of the individual at the end of period 2 . Note from 
(3.1.3a) that both the maximised level of profits, *)( 2ii qπ , and θi are monotonically 
increasing in u2i. fdi represents the cost of moving, which is zero if the individual does not 
move. The entrepreneur's net wealth at the end of period 2 is θi-B(1+ri) if he does not file 
for bankruptcy, and Xi if he does. Thus the level of gross wealth at which he is indifferent 
between filing and not filing is given by 
 
 iθ =Xi+B(1+ri)        (3.1.5) 
 
Hence if θi < iθ , the individual will file for bankruptcy. Given this, the entrepreneur’s net 
wealth is determined both by the decision to file for bankruptcy, as well as the exemption 
level. If the individual files for bankruptcy and his wealth is greater than the exemption 
level, he will be left with exactly the exemption amount. If he files and his wealth is less 
                                                 
14 Note that we can introduce a positive cost of filing for bankruptcy, without affecting the main analysis. In 
that case, the entrepreneur upon filing for bankruptcy must give up any wealth that exceeds the exemption 
level, or max[θi-cost of bankruptcy filing-Xi,0]. For ease of convenience, and since the cost of  filing for 
bankruptcy is not very different across US states, we assume that the cost is zero. 
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than the exemption level, he will be left with his actual wealth. Summarizing, the 
entrepreneur net wealth is 
 
θi if  θi < Xi,         (3.1.6) 
Xi if Xi ≤  θi ≤ iθ ,       (3.1.7) 
θi -B(1+ri) if  θi > iθ         (3.1.8) 
 
Since θi is monotonically increasing in u, corresponding to iθ  is a unique realization of 
u2i, which we denote by u2i*. Thus if u2i is less than u2i *, the individual will file for 
bankruptcy, and if it is higher than ui*, he will not. Further, if the individual does file for 
bankruptcy, conditions (3.1.6) and (3.1.7) indicate that he can either be left with the 
exemption amount, or his actual wealth. There is a unique realization of u2i, such that 
ii X=θ , which we denote by 2iuˆ . If u2i < 2iuˆ , the level of wealth is below Xi and the 
individual is left with exactly iθ , and if u2i > 2iuˆ , the individual is left with Xi.  
 
CREDIT MARKET 
 
The lenders in the credit market are assumed to be risk neutral. They face a fixed 
opportunity cost of funds denoted by rf, and they are willing to lend as long as they earn 
zero expected profits. If the realization of u2i is  between iu2ˆ  and u2i
 *, the individual files 
for bankruptcy and the lenders receive ( ii X−θ ), while if ii uu 22 ˆ< , lenders receive 
nothing. Thus the lenders’ zero profit condition is given by 
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Lenders set the interest rate to satisfy this equation, otherwise they do not lend. To study 
the effect of changes in exemptions on the rate of interest charged by creditors, we take 
the total derivative of (3.1.9) to get15 
∫
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Hence lenders will charge higher rates of interest on loans as exemptions increase, since 
the amount that they can reclaim in case of bankruptcy is lower. 
 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
The individual chooses whether to start a business at home, to start a business in the 
neighboring state, or to start no business and receive U(W`). The expected utility from 
starting a business in state i is given by, 
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            (3.1.11) 
where the limits are as defined before. 
 
                                                 
15 It can be shown that other terms, involving derivatives of the limits, cancel out. 
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The individual will be willing to move if the expected utility from moving (EUM) is 
greater than U(W') and greater than the expected utility from not moving (EUNM). 
Assuming that entrepreneurship is more attractive than wage employment, the individual 
moves if   
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Note that the the cost of moving is included in the definition of θn .Next we consider how 
changes in the exemption level in the neighboring state affect the attractiveness of 
moving, given by ∆EU. To do this, we take the total derivative of (3.1.12) and substitute 
for 
i
i
dX
dr from (3.1.10) and find, 16 
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Similarly for the home state: 
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16 Note that the total derivative involves other terms, like derivatives of the limits, which cancel out. 
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The sign of these expressions are, respectively, the signs of 
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The effect of neighbor's exemption on the attractiveness of moving is positive. The 
expression (3.1.14a) equals the entrepreneur's marginal utility of wealth when he files for 
bankruptcy and keeps Xn, minus his average marginal utility of wealth when he avoids 
bankruptcy and keeps )1( nn rB +−θ . For risk averse entrepreneurs, this expression must 
be positive, since wealth when filing for bankruptcy is lower than wealth when avoiding 
bankruptcy, so the marginal utility of wealth must be higher when filing for bankruptcy. 
Thus as long as credit is available, an increase in the neighbor’s exemption level 
increases the attractiveness of becoming a business owner in the neighboring state, even 
though credit is more expensive when the exemption limit is higher.17 In other words, 
individuals are less likely to start businesses in their own state if business conditions in 
neighboring state are better. At the same time, expression (3.1.14b) suggests that an 
increase in own state exemptions reduces the attractiveness of moving. 
 
                                                 
17 One can also show that the model implies that the net expected utility is decreasing in the cost of moving 
(or distance moved) and that higher expected profits, or better demand conditions in neighboring state, 
increase the attractiveness of moving. 
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1.3.2 Empirical Model 
 
In my empirical work, I first examine small business openings, and then consider small 
business closings. I use the same structure for both parts. I adopt a probit formulation 
with a latent variable specification, allowing for individual random effects and testing the 
significance of the state dummies in different specifications. Since the structure of the 
model is the same for openings and closures, for expositional purposes I discuss only the 
model for small business openings. Model estimation is discussed fully in the appendix.  
 
My model can be specified as 
Yit* = δ0+ δ1Dit1+ δ2Dit2+…+ δ44Dit39+ Xit B1+ (Wit.Zt)B2+(Yit-1,2)B3+εit ; i=1,..,N, t=3..T 
           (3.2.1)          
       Yit=1 if Yit*   > 0 
Yit=0 if Yit*  ≤  0 
εit = αi +uit  
 
For values in years t=1,2, data on Yit-1,2  is not available. For these observations, I specify: 
Yit*= γ0+ γ1Dit1+γ2Dit2+…+γ44Dit39 +XitB4+ (Wit.Zt)B5 +εit ;i=1,….,N, t=1,2        (3.2.1a) 
Yit=1 if Yit*>0 
Yit=0 if Yit*≤ 0 
εit = αi +uit  
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The subscript i relates to the cross sectional unit. The subscript t relates to the time 
period. My latent variable is Yit* and my observed dependent variable is Yit.  Yit relates to 
a cross sectional unit i’s decision (for expositional purposes) to start a business in year t. 
In particular, Yit=1 if the ith cross sectional unit starts a business in year t, and 0 
otherwise. Note that the sample consists only of people who did not own a business at the 
beginning of year t. The lagged dependent variable Yit-1,2 indicates whether the household 
owned a business at some point in the preceding two years.18 The cross sectional unit is 
assumed to start a business in a geographic unit which we call state, in which it resides. 
Dit1,…….,Dit39 are state dummy variables. Since we have an intercept, our analysis is 
effectively in terms of 40 states. The reason we have 40 states and not 50 is that since the 
number of observations in some states was small, they had to be grouped together. The 
states that were joined together are discussed in some detail below. Yit is explained in 
terms of the latent variable Yit*, which captures the factors responsible for the decision. 
 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables relating to cross sectional unit i in year t. These 
variables include both state-level variables, such as unemployment benefit variables and 
bankruptcy exemption measures, and also family level variables such family wealth, the 
entrepreneur’s labor or business income, and other demographic characteristics. These 
are explained in detail below. B1 is a coefficient vector.  
 
                                                 
18 Since the data are available monthly, I define as a business start when a person who did not own a 
business in January of that year, does own a business at some point during the year. 
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Wit. is a 1x40 row vector that assigns a positive weight to “neighbor states”, as defined 
below. The weight assigned to all other states is zero. The reason why there are only 40 
states is that the SIPP dataset identifies 41 individual states and the District of Columbia. 
The nine other states are aggregated into three groups.19 However, in my model, I drop 
observations for Hawaii (since no neighbors can be defined), and New Mexico and DC.20 
Further, I add New Hampshire to the state unit comprising Maine and Vermont, and 
define Rhode Island and Connecticut as one state unit.21 Neighboring states are defined as 
those that are adjacent to the state in which the cross sectional unit resides. I assume that 
the ith unit will not consider moving to states that are not adjacent, and I assign these 
states a weight of zero.  In different specifications of the model, I experiment with 
assigning a positive weight to all neighbor states or only to those neighboring states that 
have more favorable business conditions than the state in which the cross sectional unit is 
currently located, since these are arguably the only states the ith unit would consider as 
an alternate location for the business. The formulation of the weighting matrix is 
explained in detail below. 
 
 Zt is a 40xK matrix of observations on K state-level macroeconomic variables. These 
variables vary across time and state. They are explained in more detail below. B2 is a Kx1 
parameter vector. 
                                                 
19These groups are (1) Maine and Vermont; (2) Iowa, North Dakota and South Dakota; (3) Alaska, Idaho, 
Montana and Wyoming. 
 
 
20 These states are dropped due to insufficient observations, and they cannot be merged with neighbors 
since their policies are not similar. 
 
 
21 New Hampshire lies between Maine and Vermont, so it forms a natural unit. Rhode Island has few 
observations and is similar to Connecticut in its policies. 
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εit is the disturbance term in the latent variable formulation. It has an error components 
structure, where the process {uit} is iid over i and t, and the cross sectional component αi 
is iid over i. 
 
1.3.3 Definition of Variables 
 
The vector of explanatory variables includes state-level variables as well as demographic 
variables22. In particular, Xit includes the following: 
 
1. Bankruptcy Exemption: These are the bankruptcy exemptions that the cross 
sectional unit faces in its home state. I use the homestead exemption as well as the 
personal property exemption. The homestead exemption is an exemption for 
equity in owner occupied housing. As shown in Figure 1 for the year 1996, this 
varies widely among states, with some states having no exemption and seven 
states having unlimited exemptions  (states shown in black). Most states also have 
exemptions for household belongings, equity in vehicles, retirement accounts, and 
a wildcard category that can be applied to any type of asset. The exemption levels 
have changed over time in many states. For instance between 1993-1998, 28 
states effected changes to their homestead and/or property exemptions. These 
exemptions provide partial wealth insurance to entrepreneurs, and are therefore 
expected to encourage entrepreneurship. 
 
                                                 
22 For the grouped states, I use sample population weighted averages of these variables. 
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2. State per capita income: This variable has been changing over time for all states. 
High state incomes may be associated with high demand, encouraging 
entrepreneurship. At the same time, this may mean higher incomes for current job 
earners, and thus transitions to entrepreneurship may be reduced. 
 
3. The top marginal state income tax rate, which has changed over time for 25 states 
in the period 1993-1998. Most studies find that high personal taxes encourage 
transitions to entrepreneurship, except for Georgellis and Wall (2002), who find 
the relationship to be U-shaped.23 High personal taxes encourage tax avoidance 
which is easier for business owners than for salary workers. 
 
4. State unionization rate, state unemployment rate and the proportion of population 
in non farm employment. High state unionization rates may discourage 
entrepreneurship as wages may be higher, while different studies find differing 
effects of unemployment rates. 24 
 
5. The self employment or unemployment assistance benefits for each state. For the 
unemployment benefits, I consider the replacement rate (the ratio of the average 
unemployment benefit paid out to the average weekly wage) in each state. This 
variable varies over time for 25 states in the sample. The data are available from 
                                                 
23 Cullen and Gordon (2002), Bruce (1998) 
 
 
24 The nonfarm employment rate is entered to correct for the fact that bankruptcy law is different for 
farmers. 
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the US Department of Labor. The sign on this coefficient is ambiguous since the 
availability of generous benefits may discourage any kind of movement out of 
unemployment, but at the same time, the financial assistance provided may 
encourage entrepreneurship.  
 
6. Individual and family level variables, including marital status, age, race, health 
insurance coverage, employment status and education level, as well as family 
income from wealth and whether the family owns their home. 
 
The matrix Zt includes observations on state-level variables that may be important for 
starting a business in neighboring states, such as  
1. The  bankruptcy exemption variable 
2. Per capita income 
3. The maximum marginal state income  tax rate 
 
Finally, I describe the Nx40 spatial weights matrix, Wt=[W'1t.,………..,W'Nt.]'. At any time 
t, the ith row of this matrix is given by Wit., which specifies “neighborhood sets” for each 
observation i. The ij-th element of Wt, namely, wij,t, is positive if j is a “neighbor” of i, 
and is zero otherwise. In our spatial model, I consider two weighting matrices. One is 
based on distance and the other on population. These weighting matrices were used to 
create weighted averages of exemptions, per capita incomes and tax rates in neighboring 
states. I also present results with simple averages of these variables. In somewhat more 
detail, the ijth element of the weighting matrix based on population at time t, is, 
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w         where k is the number of “neighbor” states for individual i. 
The weighting matrix based on distance is defined in a similar manner. By convention, a 
cross sectional unit is not a neighbor to itself, so that the diagonal elements of Wt are all 
zero i.e wii,t=0. I also experiment with assigning a positive weight to only those 
“neighbors” that have the highest exemptions. 
 
1.3.4 Data Sources and Description 
 
In my study, I use longitudinal datasets available from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), published by the Census Bureau. I use the SIPP 
longitudinal datasets for 1993-1995 and 1996-1998, and I present results for the pooled 
panel 1993-98, as well as for the sub-sample 1993-95. SIPP is a multi-panel longitudinal 
survey of adults, measuring their economic and demographic characteristics over a period 
of approximately three years. Persons selected into the SIPP sample continue to be 
interviewed once every four months over the three years of the panel. At the time of the 
interview they are asked questions relating to the previous four months. Thus the data are 
available monthly for each person in the panel. For instance, the 1993 SIPP panel consists 
of approximately 120,000 individuals who were interviewed in 1993, 1994 and 1995. I 
will look at a balanced panel of cross sectional units that have data available for all three 
years. Though the data are available at an individual level, it is possible to uniquely 
identify a family or a household, and construct family level variables. The data gives 
information about the state (though not the county) in which the individual is located at 
27 
the time of the interview. Thus SIPP records movement of members in the sample and 
changes in the household composition.  
 
The summary statistics in Table 1.1 reveal sample characteristics for the 1993-98 panel. 
SIPP interviews all individuals above 15 years of age in the sample household. The 
sample has a larger proportion of whites, while Blacks form only 13% of the sample. 
About 30% of the sample has attended college, while about 38% are married. About 59% 
of the overall sample (and 70% of the business owners) own a home, thus justifying the 
use of the homestead exemption as an important factor in the analysis. Over the entire 
period, about 1.5% of the sample started a business, while 1.9% ended one. Figure 3 
profiles business owners in the sample. Controlling for sample shares of the relevant 
groups, a large fraction of business startups are by white males. College educated 
individuals and married men are more likely to start businesses, as are people younger 
than 50. The corresponding statistics for business closures (not shown) are the reverse of 
those for business startups; white, college educated, young and married males are less 
likely to close down their businesses. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2, there appears to be a large and positive correlation 
between business starts and closures across states in different years. In particular, even 
controlling for population size, states with high start up rates, such as California and 
Florida, also have high closure rates. Further, Figure 1.2 suggests a mild positive 
correlation between exemptions and startups (.0139), and exemptions and closures 
(.0036) (controlling for sample state size). 
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1.4 Regression Results25 
 
1.4.1 Business Start Results 
 
In this section, I present regression results for business starts, estimated with the random 
effects probit described in detail in the appendix. I define a dummy equal to one if the 
cross sectional unit did not own a business at the beginning of the year, but does own a 
business at some point during the current year. The sample is thus restricted to all 
individuals who did not own a business at the beginning of the year.26 Table 1.3 presents 
results including the lagged dependent variable and the health insurance variables, but 
excluding the spatial variables. Table 1.4a presents results with the spatial variables for 
the pooled 1993-98 panel.27 The sample size is 312,845 for the pooled panel.28  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The state units are as defined in Table 2. 
 
 
26 To define the state level variables relevant for a particular individual, we use the state in which the 
individual resided at the beginning of the year. The dependent variable is 1 if the individual started a 
business in that same state during the year, and 0 otherwise. We have estimated the model coding the 
dependent variable as 1 even if the individual moved to a different state and started a business there in that 
same year. Results were similar. 
 
 
27 The estimated variances for the 1996-98 panel were larger than for 1993-95, hence pooling imposes the 
arbitrary restriction of equal variances. That is why I report results for the 1993-95 panel separately as well, 
rather than just the pooled panel. 
 
 
28 Note that the 1993 panel covers the period October 1992-Dec 1995, so I have only three years of full 
data. 
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Estimation Technique 
The estimation strategy involves the following steps. Step 1: Following the specification 
outlined in Appendix A.1, we pool data across the years 1993-95, but allow for different 
coefficients in 1995 when we have data on lagged business ownership available. Note 
that the effect of state-level conditions on entrepreneurship can be captured by putting in 
either state-level variables or state dummy variables for each year for the 40 state units 
defined in the sample. There are overall 40 state units. The state effects can therefore be 
completely accounted for by including 40 state dummies for each year. My model 
specifies 16 observable state variables, whose values vary over time. My null hypothesis 
is that these 16 state variables, plus an intercept whose value is allowed to be different for 
each of the three years, are sufficient to account for all the state effects. Thus in each year 
since there are 40 state units, that leaves 23 degrees of freedom. Hence, I specify the 
regression equation in each year with all the demographic variables, 16 state variables 
(own state and weighted neighbor state), a time intercept, and 23 state dummies, and test 
for the joint significance of the )323( ×  state dummy variable coefficients.29 Testing 
revealed the 69 state dummies to be insignificant. Thus the model is specified without the 
state dummies. 
 
A further test of the model involved testing for equality of the coefficients on state-level 
variables in 1995 and 1993-1994. The chi square statistic was small, and I could not 
reject the null hypothesis that these coefficients are identical. Thus the model is specified 
                                                 
29 The usual Hausman specification test did not work due to numerical problems. Also, inclusion of all state 
dummies in this specification would have lead to collinearity problems. 
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with time varying coefficients for the demographic variables, but time-invariant 
coefficients for the state-level variables for all three years. 
 
Step 2: The procedure for model estimation and the treatment of state dummies was 
replicated for the 1996-98 panel. Testing revealed the state dummies to be jointly 
insignificant. I then tested for equality of the coefficients on state-level variables in 1998 
and 1996-97, and concluded that they were insignificantly different from each other.  
 
Step 3: Finally, I pooled across the two panels. The coefficients on state-level variables 
for 1996-98 were not significantly different from 1993-95. Hence the final model pools 
the six years and imposes time-invariant coefficients for state-level variables. 
 
Results 
 I first estimate the model without the spatial variables, as shown in Table 1.3. The 
coefficient on exemptions is significant and positive at the 1% level, similar to Fan and 
White (2003) and Georgellis and Wall (2002). The predicted probability of starting a 
business is increasing in the exemption level.30 I also get significant coefficients for the 
lagged dependent variable (positive and significant), as well as the health insurance 
variables. Since these results are similar in the model with spatial variables, I discuss 
these in greater detail in the following section.  
 
                                                 
30 On average, an increase in the exemption limit by $50,000 increases the probability of a business start by 
20%. 
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Results including the spatial variables are presented in Table 1.4a. The model performs 
well, in that it confirms previous findings on the demographic variables, and also 
produces significant estimates of the spatial variables. The explanatory variables include 
whether the individual is male, has attended college and is married, all of which have a 
positive and significant impact on business formation. I also include race and ethnicity 
effects, which confirm earlier results (Meyer, 1990) that Blacks and other ethnic 
minorities are less likely to start businesses. The positive linear and negative quadratic 
terms in age imply that the effect of age is inverted U-shaped. Younger individuals (less 
than 44 years) are more likely to start businesses. The effect of family wealth is positive 
and significant, suggesting that high wealth reduces credit constraints that the business 
owner may face (Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Individuals who 
have high earnings from current jobs may be less likely to switch to starting a business 
(Evans and Leighton, 1989). At the same time, individuals with high incomes may have 
the financial means to start a business. This coefficient is significant and positive. Fan 
and White (2003) surprisingly do not find a statistically significant effect of earnings or 
wealth on entrepreneurship. 
 
This paper finds two new interesting results on the role of health insurance in 
entrepreneurship. If a person is in a wage and salary occupation and receives employer 
insurance, he is less likely to move towards self-employment, whereas if the individual 
has self-purchased insurance, he is more likely to start a business. Holtz-Eakin et al 
(1996) did not find a statistically significant impact of health insurance variables on 
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transitions to entrepreneurship, using SIPP 1984, 1986 and 1987 panels.31  The marginal 
effects suggest that employer insurance reduces the probability of transition by 5%, 
whereas self-insurance increases the likelihood by nearly 1%.32 If the person is 
unemployed, he is significantly less likely to start a business. I defined a dummy for 
whether the person was unemployed, and (in some specifications, as shown in Column 4) 
interacted that dummy with the average unemployment benefit for that state and a 
dummy for whether the state had a Self Employment Assistance (SEA) program. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant, but the coefficient on SEA is positive 
and significant at 15%, providing some evidence on the effectiveness of these programs 
in transitions to entrepreneurship out of unemployment. The above mentioned results are 
robust to different specifications. 
 
Apart from the demographic variables, I control for the level of state per capita income 
(PCI), which serves as an indicator of demand conditions, and for the maximum marginal 
state income tax rate. The sign on the tax coefficient is positive, though insignificant, 
which is in accordance with Bruce (2000), who finds that high tax rates induce 
individuals towards self-employment due to the tax avoidance incentive. State income is 
positive in all specifications, indicating that better economic conditions induce transitions 
to entrepreneurship. I use state unemployment rates, state unionization rates and nonfarm 
employment as additional controls.  In most specifications, the state unemployment rate 
                                                 
31 They controlled for other job characteristics, like whether the job offered dental insurance, pension etc, 
and whether the spouse had insurance. I control for income from job, and whether the person was self-
insured. SIPP 1993 panel does not specifically ask whether the spouse had insurance. 
 
 
32 For the 1993-95 panel, the corresponding value for employer insurance is 7%, and for self-purchased 
insurance, 6%. 
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is positive, suggesting that a lack of job opportunities may push people towards 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The main variables of interest are the bankruptcy exemptions in one's own state as well as 
in neighboring states. To study the effect of own state exemptions, I use the sum of the 
actual homestead and personal property exemption level, by setting a value of 250000 for 
the unlimited homestead exemption. This value is sufficiently high to not be binding. I 
now examine the spatial variables more closely.  
 
I define the variable, AVGNBEX, as a weighted average of exemptions of all 
neighboring states. High average exemptions in neighboring states may have two 
opposing effects on entrepreneurship. First, if we look at Figure 1, there appears to be 
some clustering of states across different exemption ranges. So high average neighbor 
exemptions imply that the individual's own state is likely to be located in a "high 
exemption" region, and this has a positive effect on entrepreneurship. This effect could be 
captured by the own state exemptions as well. However, at the same time, the individual 
could presumably be better off moving to a neighboring state with higher exemptions 
than in own state, which lowers the probability that the entrepreneur will start a business 
in his own state.  To capture the second effect clearly, I define a separate dummy 
variable, DUMAVEX, for whether the average exemption of the neighboring states is 
higher than one's own exemption.  
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In Column 1, I report results for the full set of state variables, using the pooled 1993-98 
panel. The own state exemption is insignificant in this specification. DUMAVEX is 
significant and negative at 5%, suggesting that if the average neighbor exemption is 
higher than one's own, this significantly lowers entrepreneurship in one's own state. 
Interpreting the marginal effect, this reduces the probability of starting a business by 
about 1% (given the base probability of 1.51%), which is economically significant.33 I 
also put in dummy variables, DUMAVPC and DUMAVTX, which equal one if the 
average neighbor PCI is higher, or tax rate is lower, respectively, than in one's own state. 
DUMAVTX and DUMAVPC are the right sign, but insignificant.  
 
In column 1, I control for distance weighted averages of conditions in neighbor states. 
The distance between any two states is defined as the geographic distance between their 
respective capital cities.34 The greater the distance between neighboring states, the lower 
will be the effect of high exemptions in that state on entrepreneurship in one’s own state. 
Distance weighted AVGNBEX is insignificant. Other spatial variables included in the 
model are average neighbor per capita incomes, AVGNBPC, and average neighbor tax 
rates, AVGNBTX. AVGNBPC is negative and significant at 10%, indicating that high 
average incomes in neighboring states reduce entrepreneurship in one’s own state. 
AVGNBTX is the right sign, but insignificant. 
 
                                                 
33 Note that the total number of business starts in my sample is approximately 4600, out of the total sample 
of 312,000 (approx.). If the probability is reduced by 1%, this implies that there are roughly 50 less starts. 
Weighting these numbers by the total US population, this reduces business starts by approximately 50,000. 
 
 
34 I experimented with defining the distance between two states as distance between their largest cities, 
rather than the capital cities. Results do not change. 
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Results in Column 1 suggest that controlling for DUMAVEX reduces the significance of 
own state exemptions. In Column 2 I keep all the other variables in the model, but drop 
the own state exemption. The estimated marginal effect for DUMAVEX does not change 
and is negative, but the significance level improves to 1%. Estimates of other variables 
are similar to those in Column 1. 
 
 In column 3, I introduce the own state exemption variable, EXEMPTION, into the 
model, but remove AVGNBEX. DUMAVEX is still significant, but EXEMPTION is not. 
DUMAVEX reduces the probability of business formation in own state. Thus even 
controlling for own state exemptions does not reduce the significance of DUMAVEX. 
AVGNBPC is negative and significant as in Column 1. The last specification that we 
tried included the distance weighted AVGNBEX and the own state exemption. In this 
case, AVGNBEX is insignificant, while EXEMPTION is positive and marginally 
significant at 10%. This result is not shown here.  
  
In Column 4, I present results using population weighted averages of neighbor 
conditions. Results are similar to those outlined in Column 1. Population weights capture 
the idea that individuals are more likely to move to more populous states (since in general 
these are also the states with more job opportunities, larger markets, etc). The signs on 
the demographic variables do not change. The coefficient on the exemption level is not 
significant, but DUMAVEX is negative and significant as before. 
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Summarizing the results on the effect of exemptions, it is interesting to note that when the 
spatial variables are included in the model of Table 1.3, the impact of own state 
exemptions is lowered. Thus it appears that while own state exemptions are important to 
entrepreneurs, they seem to also care about the relative exemption in their state vis-à-vis 
the neighboring states. This is plausible since as pointed out in the introduction, small 
firms are subject to high failure and closure rates, and risk averse entrepreneurs would 
make the optimal choice among competing locations.  
 
A plausible conjecture in our model is that states are most likely to be affected by their 
closest neighbor. Thus the greater the distance between two states (their capital cities), 
the less significant should be the impact on each other. Thus, in other specifications not 
shown here, I defined a different grouping for states whose farthest contiguous neighbor 
is less than 200 miles, and one whose farthest contiguous neighbor is less than 300 miles. 
This also takes care of the problem of distinguishing between the really big states like 
California, where the impact of neighboring states may be expected to be less, and the 
small states like New Jersey that have very close neighbors. The marginal effects on the 
spatial variables are larger for the states with less distant neighbors.35 Another way we 
tested for the effect of distance is by first defining a dummy for all states whose closest 
neighbor was less than 200 miles away, and interacting that dummy with the average 
neighbor exemption variable. The interaction term is significantly negative. 
 
                                                 
35 The coefficient on DUMAVEX is -.003 for states with neighbors less than 300 miles away, while 
DUMAVEX is -.007 for neighbors less than 200 miles away. 
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Finally, I present results for the lagged dependent variable, LAGBSTRT. This is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for those individuals who owned a business at some point in 
the previous two years. This coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that people 
who have owned a business before are nearly 20% more likely to start a business today. 
This is consistent with the recent study of small business owners by Sullivan et al (1998) 
which finds that business owners who file for bankruptcy have a higher likelihood of 
starting new businesses within the next year. Note that this variable is not defined for the 
years 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997, since lagged information is not available for these 
years.  
 
In other specifications (not shown), I look at the effect of the highest exemption neighbor 
on the entrepreneurship decision. Coefficients are similar to those reported in Column 1 
of Table 1.4a.  
 
 As another check, I pooled data using only the two years for which we have data on the 
lagged variable (1998 and 1995), to ensure that the results are not sensitive to the 
specification across different periods. For the latter specification, I do not use random 
effects since these are independent panels. Results (not shown) are similar to those 
described above. 
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1.4.2 Business Closure Results 
 
Table 1.4b presents results for business closures. I define a business closure by use of a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the person owned a business at the beginning of year t, but 
did not own a business at some point during year t. Thus the sample only includes people 
who owned a business at the beginning of the year. As a result, the sample size for the 
years 1993-1998 is fairly small, comprising only 14,983 observations. The model 
specification is similar to that estimated for business starts.36 
 
The probability of small business closures is significantly lower for males and for 
individuals who are married, and is significantly higher for Blacks and Mexicans. More 
educated individuals are less likely to close businesses, confirming the result in 
Kengasharju and Pekkala (2001). The coefficient on family wealth is positive and 
significant. One interpretation is that asset income provides entrepreneurs insurance as 
they look for other jobs, making it easier to shut down weak businesses. Individuals who 
own homes are significantly less likely to shut down, perhaps because the businesses are 
home based. Own income, which includes income from the business, is significantly 
negatively related to business closure, which is not surprising.  
 
                                                 
36 Some variables that were part of the business start model are not included here for obvious reasons, such 
as whether the individual had employer provided insurance and whether he was unemployed. Some spatial 
variables like AVGNBPC and DUMAVPC are not included since it is not clear why business owners may 
shut down their business simply because surrounding states are high income states.  
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I use additional controls for state per capita income (PCI), state maximum marginal tax 
rates, state unemployment and state unionization rates. Surprisingly, state unionization 
rates significantly reduce the probability of business closures. This could be because 
firms are more reluctant to hire workers in these markets, so that entrepreneurs may have 
more difficulty transitioning towards wage and salary occupations. Or it may be tougher 
for firms to shut down if workers are unionized. Other interesting results include the 
impact of SEA programs on the probability of business closure. The effect is negative 
and moderately significant at 15%.  
 
In the regression without the spatial variables (Column 2 in Table 1.3), the effect of own 
exemptions on small business closure is positive, but significant only at the 15% level. 
Our interpretation of this finding is that if individuals are in states with high exemptions, 
they find it easier to shut down due to the wealth insurance provided by these high 
exemptions. Including the spatial variables in the regression (Table 1.4b), makes the own 
state exemptions insignificant. I use distance weighted averages of neighbor conditions in 
Column 1. The sign on the spatial variable, DUMAVEX is significant and positive. 
DUMAVEX captures the idea that higher average exemptions in neighboring states 
increase the probability of business closure as businesses may decide to relocate to higher 
exemption states. AVGNBTX and AVGNBEX are not significantly related to closure.  
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In Column 2 of Table 1.4b, I drop own state exemption from the model. DUMAVEX is 
marginally significant and continues to be positive. AVGNBTX is negative, though not 
significant.37 
 
 Finally I include a lagged dependent variable, LAGBSCLOS, which is equal to 1 if the 
individual did not own a business in the previous two years. The positive sign on this 
variable indicates that people who did not own a business before are more likely to shut 
down. 
 
I also estimated the model using multinomial logit. The choice set included the following: 
not shut down, shut down and not move, shut down and move. The marginal effects are 
most significant for those who shut down and move. In particular, DUMAVEX is 
positive and significant. 
 
1.5 Specification tests 
 
I estimated several alternative specifications of the above model. I divided the own state 
exemptions into five categories, as in Fan and White (2003), to allow for the possibility 
of a non-monotonic relationship between exemptions and entrepreneurship, as in 
                                                 
37 In other specifications, I also introduced DUMAVPC into the model. It was insignificant, and did not 
affect other results. I also introduced DUMAVTX  and it turned out positive and significant in some 
specifications. Lower taxes in neighbor states increase the probability of business closure, as entrepreneurs 
may decide to relocate to these states to take advantage of better conditions 
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Georgellis and Wall(2002).38,39 I found no significant effect of own state exemption 
variables. The spatial variables remained significant and had the same signs. I also tried 
adding a quadratic term (along with the linear term) in the own exemption variable, and 
found that the quadratic was not significant. 
 
 I redefined the business ownership variable to include only those businesses whose 
owner spent more than 35 hours per week on his business. Further, I allowed for the 
exemption variable to have different effects depending on whether the business owner 
was a renter or a homeowner.  The estimated coefficients on own state exemptions were 
larger for homeowners.  
 
Another specification check was to define all the other 39 states as potential neighbors, 
instead of only looking at states that are contiguous. In this case,  the population weighted 
average exemption variable was not significant, though the own state exemption was still 
significant and positive. 
 
Also, as a final check, I imposed equality of all coefficients across the two panels, and 
estimated the model by introducing time-invariant state dummies into the pooled 1993-98 
model. The results relating to the own state exemption variable and the average neighbor 
exemption did not change. 
                                                 
38 The categories are: States with unlimited exemptions, states with exemptions in the range 95000 to 
200000, states with exemptions in the range 60000 to 95000 and states with exemptions in the range 20000 
to 60000.  
 
 
39 They find that entrepreneurship falls at certain high exemption levels, which may be due to lower credit 
availability in states with high exemptions (Berkowitz and White, 2002).  
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The main conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that spatial variables are 
significant predictors of small business formation across states. States must recognize that 
businesses have the option to move outside the state to take advantage of better business 
conditions. Thus states must follow policies that are competitive with at least their 
immediate neighbors, since much migration happens between neighboring states. While 
some existing studies have looked at tax competition between competing jurisdictions, 
e.g Brueckner et al (1999), this is the first paper to study the effect of competing policies 
encouraging small business formation among US states. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided empirical evidence on the effect of bankruptcy law on small 
business formation. The unique contribution of this paper is the addition of spatial terms 
measuring the effect of business conditions in surrounding states on the decision to set up 
or close a business in the current state. The results suggest that entrepreneurs choose the 
location of their businesses in response to competing business conditions, in and outside 
the state. The focus of this paper is on small businesses. Since these represent the 
majority of all businesses and contribute to high rates of both job creation and job 
destruction in most OECD economies, it is important to study the factors that determine 
their birth and closure, which this paper has attempted to do. While the focus of this 
paper is on small businesses in the US, the policy implications of this study apply more 
generally to all economies. In particular, in Europe, where bankruptcy laws and other 
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business conditions are not as friendly towards small business, and also in developing 
economies, where the majority of individuals own small businesses, adopting appropriate 
policies towards bankruptcy may encourage the growth of these economies. 
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Appendix 
 
1.A.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
In the model with a lagged dependent variable, the initial value of the dependent variable 
may be correlated with the random effects term. One solution for this is to specify a 
separate equation for the initial value of the dependent variable (Heckman, 1981). Our 
procedure is explained in detail below. 
Consider the model 
itititit YxY εγβ ++′= − 2,1*   TtNi t ,...,3;,..,1 ==          (1) 
1=itY  if 0* >itY          (1a) 
0=itY  otherwise         (1b) 
itiit u+= αε           (1c)  
where itx  is an exogenous vector and where iα  and itu  are random elements. We assume 
that the processes { }iα and { }itu  are independent, iα  is i.i.d.N(0, 2ασ ) and itu  is i.i.d. 
N(0, 2uσ ) over both i and t. In the model specified above, (1) is defined for t=3,..,T. The 
reason for including the lagged value Yit-1,2, is to capture "state dependence". I allow the 
unit to have owned or not owned a business, in the previous two years. For t=1,2 we 
assume that *itY  is generated by a similar process, except that there is no lagged 
dependent variable. Hence we allow the coefficients to be different for these years. This 
is similar to the formulation by Arulampalam (2000), although unlike that model, my 
model involves joint estimation based on ( )iTi YY ,....,1  so that the likelihood function 
includes the initial years. Therefore, when t=1,2, we assume 
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ititit xY ελ +′=*   i=1,..,Nt      (2) 
0 if 1 * >= itit YY         (2a) 
otherwise 0=itY         (2b) 
itiit u+= αε          (2c) 
where itx  is exogenous, the processes { }iα and { }itu  are independent, and itu  is i.i.d 
N(0, 2uσ ). Thus combining specifications, itu  is i.i.d.N(0, 2uσ ) for i=1,..,Nt and t=1,..,T . 
 
Let )|,....,( 1),1(, iiTiTi yyG α  be the joint density of ( )iTi YY ,....,1  conditional on iα , and the 
sequence iTi xx ,...,1 . The dependence on the entire sequence of x’s is the reason for the 
subscript (1,T) in the joint density. Then recalling that itu  is i.i.d. over t=1,..,T and using 
evident notation, 
 
)|,....,( 1),1(, iiTiTi yyG α = ),|()....,|()|()|( 2,12,1332211 iiTiTiTiiiiiiiiii yygyygygyg αααα −  
           (3) 
= )|()|(),|( 11222,1
3
iiiiiiiitit
T
t
it ygygyyg ααα−
=
∏      (4) 
 
Recalling that iα  is i.i.d., let )( ih α  be the density of iα . Then the likelihood for the 
entire sample, which is not conditional on ,,.....,1 Nαα is 
 
∏
=
= t
N
i
iLL
1
          (5) 
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where  
iiiiiiiiiitit
T
t
itiTitiTiui dhygygyygxxyyL ααααασσγλβ α )()|()|(),|(),....,,,.....,|,,,,( 11222,1
3
2 −
∞
∞− =
∫∏=
           (6) 
and where TtNiy tit ,...,1 and ,..,1 allfor  1,0 === . 
 
Note that, ),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− , the density of itY  conditional on i2,1  and α−itY , can be 
expressed as follows, 
),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− = −′−> βε itit xob(Pr 2,1−ityγ )    
for  TtNiy tit ,..,3;,..,1;1 ===        (7) 
and when t=1,2 
)|( iitit yg α = λε itit xob ′−>(Pr )  for tit Niy ,..,1;1 ==     (8) 
 
Similarly, 
),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− = −′−< βε itit xob(Pr 2,1−ityγ )    
 for tit NiTty ,...,1;,...,3;0 ===        (9) 
and, when t=1,2 
)|( iitit yg α = λε itit xob ′−<(Pr )  for tit Niy ,..,1;0 ==                         (10) 
 
Now, note that iit αε | ~ ),( 2uiN σα for all t=1,..,T. Therefore, the change of variable 
u
iit
itz σ
αε −=  in the probability expressions in (7)-(10) will yield probability statements 
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based on the standard normal variable, itz . For example, carrying out this substitution in 
(7) and (8) would yield the following, 
),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− = >itzob(Pr
u
iitit yx
σ
αγβ −−′− − 2,1 )  ; t=3,….,T    (11) 
and, when t=1,2 
)|( iitit yg α =
u
iit
it
x
zob σ
αλ −′−>(Pr )          (12) 
 
Let F(.) denote the CDF of the standard normal variable. Then, using evident notation, 
(11) and (12), respectively can be expressed as follows. For t=3,..,T, 
),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− = )(1 2,1
u
iitit yxF σ
αγβ −−′−− −   for 1,0;1 2,1 == −itit yy    
           (13) 
and, when t=1,2 
)|( iitit yg α = )(1
u
iitxF σ
αλ −′−−                   for 1=ity     (14) 
Similarly, (9) and (10), respectively can be expressed as follows. For t=3,..,T, 
),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α− = )( 2,1
u
iitit yxF σ
αγβ −−′− −         for 1,0;0 2,1 == −itit yy        
           (15) 
and, when t=1,2 
)|( iitit yg α = )(
u
iitxF σ
αλ −′−
                    for 0=ity     (16) 
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Therefore, substituting the expressions for ),|( 2,1 iititit yyg α−  and )|( iitit yg α  given in 
(13)-(16), in the expression for the likelihood function in (16), and using evident notation, 
 
[ ] iiT
t
ititiTiiTiui dLowFUpFxxyyL ασπσ
ασσγλβ
αα
α 2/12
2
1
22 )2(
1)]
2
(exp[)()(),..,,..,|,,,,( −−= ∫∏∞
∞− =
 
for all i=1,…,Nt and t=1,..,T        (17) 
where, when t=3,..,T 
for 1,0       ]; and ),|([,1 2,12,1
2,1 =∞=−−′−== −−− ititiit
u
iitit
itit yUpy
yx
Lowy ασ
αγβ
  
           (18) 
for 1,0    ]; ),|( and [,0 2,12,1
2,1 =−−′−=−∞== −−− itiit
u
iitit
ititit yy
yx
UpLowy ασ
αγβ
  
           (19) 
and, when t=1,2 
for ] and )|([,1 ∞=−′−== iti
u
iit
itit Up
x
Lowy ασ
αλ
     (20) 
for ] )|( and [,0 i
u
iit
ititit
x
UpLowy ασ
αλ −′−=−∞==     (21) 
Finally, using the substitution ασα 2/12/iiw =  in (17), 
[ ] iiT
t
ititiTiiTiui dwwLowFUpFxxyyL )exp()()(
1),..,,..,|,,,,( 2
1
2/122 −−= ∫∏∞
∞− =π
σσγλβ α     
for all i=1,…,Nt and t=1,..,T        (22) 
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where in place of iα , we substitute ασα 2/12ii w=  in the expressions for Upit and Lowit 
in (18)-(21). This function is amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and can be 
computed using standard software. 
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Table 1.1 
Sample Summary Statistics for the SIPP 1993-1998 Panel 
Variable Mean Std. dev 
Males .470 .499 
Whites .827 .377 
Blacks .128 .335 
Mexican .030 .171 
Attended College .306 .471 
Married .385 .486 
Own house .588 .492 
Bankruptcy Exemptions 
(1)Homestead 
(2)Property 
 
68411.17 
10106.56 
 
77215.65 
14832.59 
State Income Tax Rate (percent) 5.06 3.09 
State Per Capita Income 
 
24398.36 
 
3443.3 
Number of business starts over 
whole panel  
Mean 
Total 
 
 
.0151 
5268 
 
 
.122 
Number of business closures over 
whole panel 
Mean 
Total 
 
 
.0194 
6083 
 
 
.285 
Correlation between exemptions 
and  
(1)starts 
(2)closures 
 
 
.0139 
.0036 
 
Change of state (movers) .011 .107 
Person monthly income 1257.58 1995.17 
Family property income/month 140 492.76 
Business Income /month 2300 4368 
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Type of business at beginning of 
sample in 1993: 
(1)Sole proprietorship 
(2) Partnership 
(3) Corporation 
 
 
480 
96 
124 
 
 
 
 
 
Persons with insurance coverage 
at time of business start (1993) 
(1) Own 
(2) Employer 
 
 
.345 
.266 
 
 
.475 
.442 
Average union percentage 14.59 6.47 
Average unemployment rate 5.69 1.47 
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Table 1.2 
Business Starts And Closures Across U.S States 
SIPP 1993-1998 
States 1993-98 1993-98 
 Starts Closures 
Alabama 50 12 
Arizona 98 111 
Arkansas 40 61 
California 649 800 
Colorado 67 76 
Connecticut, Rhode Island 84 81 
Delaware 13 19 
Florida 273 335 
Georgia 110 164 
Illinois 194 233 
Indiana 114 47 
Kansas 56 87 
Kentucky 61 80 
Louisiana 73 73 
Maryland 67 102 
Massachusetts 101 140 
Michigan 161 170 
Minnesota 132 144 
Mississippi 46 65 
Missouri 103 135 
Nebraska 42 57 
Nevada 21 32 
New Jersey 153 160 
New York 267 322 
North Carolina 128 183 
Ohio 192 221 
Oklahoma 91 111 
Oregon 93 109 
Pennsylvania 161 214 
South Carolina 58 23 
Tennessee 84 95 
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Texas 390 441 
Utah 47 46 
Virginia 92 126 
Washington 117 106 
West Virginia 33 30 
Wisconsin 81 100 
Maine, Vermont, New 
Hampshire 
64 79 
Iowa, North Dakota, South 
Dakota 
62 70 
Alaska, Idaho, Montana 
Wyoming 
27 37 
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Figure 1.1 
Homestead Exemptions 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 Correlation (state exemption, neighbor exemption) =.4761 
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Figure 1.2 
Exemptions, Births and Closures40 
Starts and Closures 1993
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Exemptions and Starts 1993
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40 Note: Business Starts and Closures are scaled by sample state populations and exemption variables have 
been rescaled to allow comparison. These graphs are representative of other sample years. 
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Figure 1.3 
Profile of Business Owners: SIPP41 
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41 All business starts are expressed as percentages of the relevant share of the group in the overall 
population. These charts are representative of other years in the sample. 
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Table 1.3: Regression Without Spatial Effects 
Selected Coefficients: 1993-98 
 
Dependent Variable Business Start 
(1) 
Business Closure 
(2) 
 Marginal Effect 
(p-value) 
Marginal Effect 
(p-value) 
Self-insurance .0001 
(.002) 
.0075 
(.487) 
 
 
Employer insurance -.0007 
(.000) 
 
 
Exemption 8.89e-10 
(.001) 
1.22e-07 
(.102) 
 
Per Capita Income 6.40e-09 
(.530) 
-1.13e-07 
(.962) 
 
Tax Rate 7.91e-06 
(.263) 
.0014 
(.497) 
 
Lagged Variable .0062 
(.000) 
.4360 
(.000) 
 
N 312,845 
 
14,983 
 
 
Note: All regressions are estimated with time dummies, all the demographic variables, 
and some state variables like the proportion of nonfarm employment, unemployment rate 
and unionization rate.  
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Table 1.4a: Random Effects Probit Regression: Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable: Business Start 
Weights Distance 
(1) 
Distance 
(2) 
Distance 
(3) 
Population  
(4) 
Years 1993-98 1993-98 1993-98 1993-98 
Male .0006 
(.000) 
.0006 
(.000) 
.0006 
(.000) 
.0006 
(.000) 
Black -.0003 
(.000) 
-.0003 
(.000) 
-.0003 
(.000) 
-.0003 
(.000) 
Mexican -.0002 
(.003) 
-.0002 
(.003) 
-.0002 
(.004) 
-.0002 
(.005) 
Family Wealth 1.47e-07 
(.000) 
1.47e-07 
(.000) 
1.48e-07 
(.000) 
1.45e-07 
(.000) 
Person Income 
from Job 
1.71e-08 
(.006) 
1.71e-08 
(.006) 
1.71e-08 
(.007) 
1.94e-08 
(.003) 
College .0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
Unemployed 
Dummy=1 if person 
is unemployed 
-.0004 
(.000) 
-.0004 
(.000) 
-.0004 
(.000) 
-.0004 
(.000) 
Age .0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
Agesquare -2.21e-06 
(.000) 
-2.21e-06 
(.000) 
-2.21e-06 
(.000) 
-2.20e-06 
(.000) 
Married .0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
Own house .00002 
(.565) 
.00002 
(.565) 
.00002 
(.562) 
.0001 
(.696) 
Employer 
Insurance 
-.0007 
(.000) 
-.0007 
(.000) 
-.0007 
(.000) 
-.0007 
(.000) 
Self Insurance .0001 
(.007) 
.0001 
(.007) 
.0001 
(.007) 
.0001 
(.005) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
.00002 
(.263) 
.00002 
(.269) 
.00002 
(.223) 
.00001 
(.454) 
Unionization rate -5.17e-06 
(.257) 
-4.77e-06 
(.236) 
-4.76e-06 
(.296) 
-3.06e-06 
(.490) 
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Table 1.4a (continued) 
Exemption -8.58e-11 
(.849) 
 2.27e-10 
(.553) 
7.39e-11 
(.850) 
Average Neighbor 
Exemption 
7.01e-10 
(.193) 
6.47e-10 
(.158) 
 1.19e-08 
(.185) 
Dumavex 
Dummy=1 if average 
Neighbor Exemption 
Higher 
-.0001 
(.046) 
-.00009 
(.009) 
-.00008 
(.097) 
-.00008 
(.088) 
Tax Rate .00001 
(.283) 
.00001 
(.247) 
.00001 
(.207) 
8.27e-06 
(.438) 
Average Neighbor 
Tax 
-3.01e-06 
(.836) 
-3.21e-06 
(.824) 
-1.75e-06 
(.904) 
1.19e-08 
(.978) 
Dumavtx 
Dummy=1 if Average 
Neighbor Tax Lower 
-.00005 
(.405) 
-.00005 
(.395) 
-.00004 
(.406) 
-.00003 
(.551) 
Per Capita Income 1.25e-08 
(.420) 
1.15e-08 
(.429) 
8.99e-09 
(.556) 
2.76e-09 
(.842) 
Average Neighbor 
Per Capita Income 
-2.42-08 
(.085) 
-2.29e-08 
(.063) 
-2.14e-08 
(.122) 
-1.38e-08 
(.320) 
Dumavpc 
Dummy=1 for Average 
Neighbor Income 
higher 
-.00005 
(.406) 
-.00005 
(.387) 
-.00006 
(.283) 
-.00008 
(.175) 
LAGBSTRT 
 
.003 
(.000) 
.003 
(.000) 
.003 
(.000) 
.003 
(.000) 
Unemployment 
benefit (avben) 
.0006 
(.242) 
.0005 
(.197) 
.0003 
(.509) 
.0006 
(.219) 
SEA (=1 if state had 
program) 
.0001 
(.092) 
.0001 
(.077) 
.0001 
(.118) 
.0001 
(.090) 
N 312,845 312,845 312,845 312,845 
Note: All specifications use time dummies ( and no constant term), and control for nonfarm employment. 
Separate coefficients for 1995 and 1998 not shown. p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 1.4b: Random Effects Probit Regression: Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable: Business Closure 
Weights  
 
Distance 
(1) 
 Distance 
(2) 
  
Years  1993-98  1993-98   
Male  -.083 
(.000) 
 -.083 
(.000) 
  
Black  .0522 
(.053) 
 .052 
(.053) 
  
Mexican  .0510 
(.235) 
 .052 
(.226) 
  
Family Wealth  .00001 
(.039) 
 .00001 
(.040) 
  
Person Income  -4.55e-06 
(.001) 
 -4.54e-06 
(.001) 
  
College  -.004 
(.659) 
 -.004 
(.651) 
  
Age  -.027 
(.000) 
 -.027 
(.000) 
  
Agesquare  .0002 
(.000) 
 .0002 
(.000) 
  
Married  -.020 
(.098) 
 -.020 
(.097) 
  
Self Insurance  .006 
(.544) 
 -.006 
(.545) 
  
Own House  -.084 
(.000) 
 -.084 
(.000) 
  
Unemployment 
Rate 
 .013 
(.035) 
 .015 
(.017) 
  
Union 
Percentage 
 -.003 
(.015) 
 -.003 
(.002) 
  
Nonfarm 
Employment 
 .005 
(.360) 
 
 
.004 
(.390) 
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Table 1.4b (continued) 
Exemption  1.13e-07 
(.379) 
    
Average 
Neighbor 
Exemption 
 -1.82e-07 
(.276) 
 -8.82e-08 
(.492) 
  
Dumavex 
Dummy=1 if 
Neighbor 
Exemption higher 
 .024 
(.100) 
 .016 
(.158) 
  
Tax Rate  .0016 
(.504) 
 .0008 
(.705) 
  
Average 
Neighbor Tax 
(avgnbtx) 
 -.004 
(.286) 
 -.004 
(.288) 
  
Per Capita 
Income 
 4.42e-06 
(.146) 
 5.03e-06 
(.089) 
  
LAGBSCLOS  .4360 
(.000) 
 .4365 
(.000) 
  
Unemployment 
Benefit (avben) 
 .101 
(.567) 
 .189 
(.192) 
  
SEA (=1 if 
state had 
program) 
 -.032 
(.108) 
 -.027 
(.162) 
  
N  14,983  14,983   
Note: All regressions use time dummies (and no constant). Separate coefficients for 1995 and 1998 not 
shown.  p-values in parentheses. 
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Chapter 2 
Empirical Determinants of FDI: A Spatial Approach42 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
How does a perceived lowering of corruption in China affect foreign direct investment 
flows into India? Does greater labor productivity in Thailand generate higher FDI flows 
for Malaysia and Indonesia as well, apart from Thailand itself? This paper is a first 
attempt to address these questions by empirically modeling determinants of FDI flows to 
emerging market economies, using a spatial approach. The paper uses data on FDI 
inflows to twenty-nine host countries such as India and China in South Asia, Brazil and 
Argentina in South America, and Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia in East Asia. 
We use panel data for the period 1980-2000 to study how a wide variety of factors 
relating to the competitive and economic environment in the host countries, affect these 
flows. 
 
In the 1970s, FDI made up only 12% of all financial flows to developing countries. 
Between 1981 and 1984 there was a sharp fall in private lending, as international banks 
lost confidence in borrowing countries' financial stability following the debt crisis of 
1982. Since the mid-1980s the growing integration of markets and financial institutions, 
                                                 
42 This paper is co-authored with Kartikeya Singh, University of Maryland, College Park 
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increased economic liberalization, and rapid innovation in financial instruments and 
technologies, especially in terms of computing and telecommunications, have contributed 
to a near doubling of private flows. Most significant has been the steady progression of 
FDI to a 35% share in 1990-1996. 
 
Among the low-income countries, China received an impressive 86% of the total FDI to 
low-income countries in 1995. Beginning with its liberalization in 1979, it received 
increasing FDI averaging US$2.5 billion per year between 1982 and 1991, thereafter 
accelerating by over 700% to US$ 37.5 billion in 1995. India recently emerged as the 
third largest recipient, after Nigeria. Incentives initiated in 1991 and subsequent `open 
door' policies have brought a cumulative FDI flow of US$ 2.9 billion during 1991-1995, 
compared with a total of US$ 1.0 billion during the previous two decades. Most of this 
flow is going into infrastructure, particularly power and telecommunications, and 
petroleum refining, petrochemicals and automobiles in the manufacturing sector.43 
 
The study focuses on factors that may affect these flows, such as the size of the market, 
degree of openness, availability of skilled labor, cost of labor, and infrastructure. 
Included in these are measures that broadly determine or capture the ease of investing and 
starting a business in a country such as indices of corruption, employment protection and 
regulatory burden. The unique contribution of this paper is to include a weighted average 
of conditions in “neighbor countries” amongst factors that may explain FDI flows into a 
country, apart from own-country fundamentals. Alternative criteria such as geographical 
proximity and economic size are used to classify countries as “neighbors”. Thus, the 
                                                 
43 Overseas Development Institute (1997) 
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paper studies whether there is competition between “neighbor countries” for FDI or 
whether instead there are complementarities between FDI flows to “neighbor countries”. 
 
Our results clearly document the following. First, corruption perception does play a big 
role in investors' decision of where to invest.  Second, FDI inflows to developing 
economies are highly interdependent. This makes it important for policy makers to take 
these “neighborhood” effects into account when designing and identifying appropriate 
strategies for attracting FDI.  One reason for the interdependence could be that some of 
these countries receive the bulk of their FDI from a common source. For example, on 
average, almost 60% of inward FDI to China, Malaysia and Thailand originates from no 
more than three sources. The US is one of the three biggest investors in both China and 
India, as well as the Latin American countries. Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia share 
Japan as a key source of FDI. 44 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the existing literature on 
FDI flows to developing economies. Section 3 details the empirical model that we use for 
estimation. Section 4 discusses the data and some summary statistics. Section 5 presents 
the econometric results from various specifications. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
In this section, we detail the main empirical studies that attempt to estimate the 
importance of the different determinants of FDI flows. The main variables generally used 
                                                 
44 Hansen et al (2003) 
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are locational or pull factors, such as the size of the market, the rate of GNP growth, 
economic stability, degree of openness of the economy, as well as several institutional 
variables, and push factors, relating to conditions in the source country. 
 
Nonnenberg et al (2004) use a panel of 38 developing economies over the period 1975-
2000. They find significant and positive effects for size of the economy (as measured by 
GNP), the average rate of growth in previous years, the level of schooling, and the degree 
of openness. Inflation and a country’s risk rating had a significant and negative effect 
upon the inflow of FDI. Finally, they find that capital market growth in developed 
countries is a strong determinant of outflows of these investments. They do not, however, 
model any spatial interactions among these economies. 
 
A paper that motivates our analysis is Hansen, Rand and Tarp (2003). This paper focuses 
on five East Asian economies-China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam-and 
asks the question whether FDI to individual countries stimulates or crowds out 
investment to regional counterparts. They use a VAR framework, and find interesting and 
significant correlations among FDI flows to countries. For example, while China 
generally benefits from FDI flows to the region, Malaysia competes for FDI with the 
sampled countries. Countries like Thailand and Indonesia sometimes compete and 
sometimes complement FDI flows to the region. In conclusion, they find significant 
interdependence among these Asian countries.45 This paper does not model economic and 
                                                 
45 As they say, on average almost 60% of inward FDI to China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam originate 
from no more than three sources. In the case of Indonesia this share is 33%. Similarly, FDI is generally 
highly concentrated in only a few sectors. These patterns no doubt can help explain the above general 
findings about the interrelationship of FDI flows. For example, the strong negative co-movement between 
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political factors in developing economies as determinants of FDI inflows. In particular, it 
does not consider whether corruption perception or labor productivity in these countries 
significantly affect flows to the region. 
 
In a recent working paper, Eichengreen and Tong (2005) use bilateral FDI flow data to 
study if the emergence of China as a destination for investment has diverted FDI receipts 
from other countries, Asian countries in particular. To do this, they include in the 
regression analysis for any particular host country, the share of China’s receipts of FDI 
from the same source country. The aggregate analysis employing bilateral FDI flows 
from OECD sources to OECD and non-OECD destinations does not indicate FDI 
diversion from other Asian countries. If anything, there is some evidence that 
developments making China a more attractive destination for FDI also make other Asian 
countries more attractive destinations for FDI, as would be the case if China and these 
other economies are part of the same global production networks. Japanese firms appear 
to be among the leaders in attempting to exploit these complementarities. On the other 
hand there is some evidence of FDI diversion from OECD recipients. The difference with 
our paper is that we include a weighted average of (perceived) business conditions in 
“neighboring countries” as a determinant of FDI flows to a particular host country, 
whereas they include China’s (share of) actual FDI flows to measure the crowding out 
effect. This enables us to highlight the relevant variables, such as corruption perception 
or labor productivity, that may be of interest to policy makers in host country 
                                                                                                                                                 
Malaysia and Indonesia is in all likelihood closely related to the fact that two out of the three most 
important FDI sectors are common and in addition they share Japan as a key source of FDI. 
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governments. Further, our study allows all developing economies to be potential 
competitors for FDI, not just China.  
 
Shang Jin Wei (2000) studies the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment. The 
sample covers bilateral investment from twelve source countries to 45 host countries. 
There are two central findings. First, a rise in either the tax rate on multinational firms or 
the corruption level in a host country reduces inward foreign direct investment. In a  
benchmark estimation, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that 
of Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by 
fifty percentage points. Second, American investors are averse to corruption in host 
countries, but not necessarily more so than average OECD investors. Other papers, 
notably Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Hines (1995), have also studied the correlation 
between corruption and FDI. In a study of foreign investment of U.S. firms, Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) failed to find a significant correlation between the size of FDI and the host 
country’s risk factor, a composite measure that includes perception of corruption as one 
of the components. Similarly, more recently, using total inward FDI (as opposed to 
bilateral FDI) Hines (1995) failed to find a negative correlation between total inward FDI 
and the corruption level in host countries. None of these papers has studied the effect of 
competing conditions in neighboring countries as a significant determinant of these 
flows. 
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2.3 Empirical Model 
 
The objective of this section is to outline the model used to empirically test the effect of 
the aforementioned variables on foreign direct investment. The panel data methodology 
we use allows for variation in attributes relating to these countries both cross sectionally 
and over time. The panel consists of 29 countries (listed in Appendix), mainly emerging 
market or developing economies, over the time period 1980-2000.  
 
The regression equation used to estimate the above model is as follows: 
 
ititititit vZWxY +′+′= λβ    i=1,…..,29; t=1,…,20 
where  
itiit uv += α   )1,0(~ Niα  ),0(~ 2uti Nu σ   
   
itY  is the observed dependent variable, measured as the level of net inward FDI (in logs) 
received by country i, at time period t.  
 
Xit  is a vector of demographic characteristics of a country  that influence the inward flow 
of FDI. The first important set of characteristics relate to the domestic market. The 
market size is measured by host country GDP or GDP growth. This emphasizes the 
importance of a large market for efficient utilization of resources and exploitation of 
economies of scale. A positive relationship is expected between GDP and inward flow of 
FDI. The relationship between the direction of the host country trade balance and FDI 
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inflow could be complex. Trade surpluses are indicative of a strong economy and may 
encourage the flow of inward FDI. Trade deficits may also stimulate inward FDI as a 
result of export diversification and import substitution policies (Ioannatos, 2004). We 
also use another measure of openness, which is the level of imports as a fraction of GDP. 
The greater the degree of openness, the larger the expected FDI flows. Second, host 
country cost considerations would be a factor. To capture this effect, we can use either 
the unit cost of labor (hourly wages corrected by hourly productivity) or value added per 
worker. Labor productivity is expected to directly affect the ability of the host country to 
attract FDI. Third, we include factors affecting the country’s overall financial 
performance such as the inflation rate or the host country government’s budget deficit. 
High inflation would inhibit inward FDI. Other studies (Root and Ahmed, 1978) find that 
investment in services, such as banking or telecommunication also has a positive impact 
on FDI flows. We will use the spread of telephone lines to control for this effect.  
 
Among social factors that may be important, we could use the literacy rate and the degree 
of urbanization. Both are expected to exert a direct impact on the flow of FDI into the 
host country.  
 
Finally, we include political factors related to the degree of corruption in the host 
country, as widespread corruption imposes difficulties for the effective conduct of 
business. To this end, we use a Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency 
International. A ten equals an entirely clean country while zero equals a country where 
business transactions are entirely dominated by kickbacks, extortion etc. The 
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Transparency International (TI) Corruption Index is an initiative taken by the Berlin-
based international non-governmental organization, TI, together with Dr Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff, an economist with the University of Goettingen. The index is a “poll of 
polls”, representing the average scores which individual countries have been given by 
international businessmen and financial journalists when polled in a variety of contexts. 
A ten equals an entirely clean country while zero equals a country where business 
transactions are entirely dominated by kickbacks, extortion etc. The data are available for 
the years 1980-1985, 1988-1992, 1995-2000. 
 
We also include a Maximum Tax Rate Index and a Capital Controls Index which rank 
countries on the basis of their tax rates and policies relating to capital flows, respectively. 
Data on the Maximum Marginal Income Tax Rate Index and Capital Controls index was 
obtained from the Fraser Institute.46 Higher ratings are for countries with lower taxes. 
The IMF reports on 13 different types of capital controls. This component is based on the 
number of capital controls levied. The zero-to-10 rating is constructed by taking 13 minus 
the number of capital controls divided by 13 and multiplied by 10. Hence low ratings are 
for countries with most capital controls. 
 
Wit is a weighting matrix that assigns a positive weight to “neighbor countries”. The 
definition of a neighbor country is quite broad in this context. First, all countries that are 
adjacent to the host country are considered neighbors, since the purely physical cost for 
an investor to move investment over to these countries is relatively low. At the same 
                                                 
46 Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson (2004). Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report. 
Vancouver: Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com 
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time, in an economic sense, all countries are potential competitors for FDI, and therefore 
we’re interested in the effect of competing business conditions in these countries on FDI 
flows to the host country. Thus in a broader sense, all countries are potential “neighbors”, 
and we will include a weighted average of conditions in these countries as an additional 
regressor determining FDI flows to the host country. The weights that we use are 
economic weights; we weight each country by its’ economic size, captured by its’ GDP.  
Thus, an element of the weighting matrix, 
∑
=
= N
k
ikt
ijt
ijt
GDP
GDP
w
1
 where k refers to all neighbors of country i. 
We also allow for distance weights, where distance weights are defined correspondingly. 
 
Finally, Zit is a vector of business conditions in neighboring countries, including variables 
such as corruption perception indices or employment protection indices.  
 
vit is assumed to have an error component structure. We allow for a random effects 
specification that assumes a host-specific error term. 
 
2.4 Data Description 
 
Note that our measure of FDI Inflows includes net FDI Inflows, representing inward 
investment by foreigners less investment taken out of the country by foreigners.  (For a 
list of countries used in the sample, see Appendix). Thus Indonesia has negative FDI 
Inflow between 1998 to 2000, as foreign investors took more money out than they 
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brought in. As shown in Fig 2.1 and Table 2.1, over the period 1980-2000, FDI inflows 
went up for most countries in the sample. On average, the highest inflows went to South 
Asia. The average corruption perception for this region is not significantly different than 
for other regions. However, in terms of GDP growth rates and worker productivity the 
region stands out above others. This may explain the attractiveness of this region as a 
potential FDI destination, as investors take advantage of the rapidly increasing market 
size and the relatively cheap and productive workforce. 
 
Studying the patterns of regional flows in Figure 1A, we find that in the 1980s and in the 
1990s there was a high positive correlation between flows to South Asia, South America 
and East Asia. However, having said that, the correlations were far stronger for South 
Asia and East Asia (.67), than for South Asia and South America (.35) or even East Asia 
and South America (.55) in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, perhaps due to the East Asian crisis, 
which did not affect South Asia too much, the correlation in flows was much larger 
between South Asia and South America (.83) than with East Asia. 
 
Studying flows within regions in Fig 1B, countries in South Asia generally show a high 
positive correlation in FDI Inflows, though China stands out in terms of the magnitude of 
its’ flows. However, in East Asia and South America countries seem to compete with 
each other for FDI flows in some years. For example, around 1999, while there was a big 
dip in flows to Singapore and Malaysia, there was an increase in flows to Philippines and 
Thailand. Similarly, around 1995, when Malaysia and Indonesia experienced a drop in 
73 
flows, Singapore actually experienced an increase. In South America, Brazil experienced 
a sudden increase in FDI flows in 1998 at the cost of Mexico and Argentina. 
 
 
2.5 Econometric Results 
 
The panel is composed of 29 countries, which include emerging market and developing 
economies, over the period 1980-2000. The sample size is further constrained by the lack 
of data availability. In particular, values of the Corruption Perception Index are not 
available for some years.47 Thus we drop those years from the sample. The dependent 
variable in the first set of results, reported in Table 2.2, is total FDI Inflows (in logs) to a 
particular host country, following the specification used by other authors. 
 
Table 2.2 starts with the simplest specification of the equation determining FDI inflows. 
A random effects GLS regression of Log (FDI Inflows) on various economic and 
political characteristics of the host country, suggests that the host country market size and 
GDP growth rate, productivity of labor and the level of trade (as a fraction of GDP), are 
significant determinants of the ability of the host country to attract FDI.48,49   Note that 
the trade variable in this study includes the sum of exports and imports, unlike other 
                                                 
47 See appendix for years for which the CPI is available. 
 
 
48 I did a Granger causality test of FDI Flows and GDP as described in Nonnenberg (2004). Results indicate 
that while FDI is granger-caused by GDP, GDP is not significantly influenced by FDI Flows. 
 
 
49 We can easily include only log(GDP) or log (GDPGrowth) instead of both in the regression, without 
affecting the results. 
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studies, where authors include the trade balance, as a measure of openness. The 
coefficient on this variable is significantly positive as found by other authors. This result 
holds even when we use imports as a fraction of GDP, another measure commonly used 
in the literature. In other results not shown, I include host country adult literacy rates as 
an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient is positive and highly significant. 
 
In the simplest specification, since the sample size is fairly limited, we do not put in too 
many additional variables. The only variable capturing the level of infrastructure in the 
country is the spread of telephone lines. The coefficient on this is positive, though not 
significant. In some specifications, we proxied for infrastructure using another additional 
variable, GROSSINV, which relates to the level of fixed investment in the country. The 
coefficient was positive and significant. 
 
One of the main variables of interest is the Corruption Perception Index (CP). Again, the 
higher the index, the less corrupt the country is perceived to be by international investors. 
The coefficient is large, positive and significant. Thus perceived corruption in a host 
country is likely to significantly discourage investment. 
 
In a second specification, we include an unweighted average of the CPI in the neighbor 
countries, where neighbor includes all of the other 28 countries. This variable, AVGCPI, 
captures the effect of competing conditions in other emerging market economies, on the 
host country’s attractiveness as an FDI destination. For now, we allow competition along 
only one dimension, which is the extent of perceived corruption in the host country 
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versus it’s neighboring countries. The coefficient on this variable is negative but not 
significant, suggesting that investors may be less likely to invest in the host country, if 
the host country is perceived to be more corrupt than it’s economic neighbors. In an 
extension to this paper, we will allow countries to compete along more than one 
dimension, such as in the degree of labor market rigidity or employment protection, or 
the extent of red tapism etc. The signs on the other variables do not change.  
 
In specification 3, we now weighted the AVGCP in neighboring countries using those 
countries’ GDP. This would weight each country by it’s economic strength, rather than 
assigning each country an equal weight. It is of interest to note that this spatial variable is 
significant in the regression.  The variable, GDPWTAVGCP, is negative and significant, 
while CP continues to be positive, but not significant. This implies that when corruption 
is perceived to go down in other competing economies, this adversely affects FDI flows 
to any particular host country. This is the first study that has explored the effect of spatial 
variables, in the FDI regression. 50 
 
Specification 4 includes some new variables into the previous regression to check for 
robustness of the sign on CP and GDPWTCP. The sign and significance of the relevant 
variables does not change. The new variables capture macroeconomic and investment 
climate conditions, such as the maximum tax rate that investors face, and capital controls 
that countries may have imposed on flows of FDI. The Maximum Tax rate and Capital 
Control variables take on the theoretically expected sign and are significant. Note that 
                                                 
50 Including both GDPWTCP and AVGCP in the same regression did not lower the significance of 
GDPWTCP. 
76 
both these variables represent rankings of countries along these indices. Thus, a country 
with a higher ranking, has a lower maximum tax rate, and is an attractive FDI destination. 
Similarly, a country with a higher ranking for capital controls, actually has a lower 
number of these controls, and thus is expected to receive higher inflows. 
 
In the final specification in Table 2.2, we assigned a positive weight only to those 
neighbor countries that are part of the same region. For example, if we’re studying FDI 
flows to any country in South Asia, then only the other countries in South Asia would be 
assigned a positive weight. The weights assigned to all other countries would be zero. 
The weighting scheme that I use here is distance weights. Hence countries that are 
geographically closer are assigned a higher weight, than countries that are distant. The 
distance here refers to the great circle distance between capital cities. Results indicate a 
large negative and significant effect of the closest neighbors’ CPI on FDI inflows to the 
host country. 
 
In other specifications shown in Table 2.3, we tried the following experiment. We 
included in the regression for (log) FDI Inflows the host country's own CP, CP for the 
region of which it is a part, and average Corruption Perception for all other regions in the 
sample. Interestingly, we got highly significant results for all the relevant variables. Own 
CP continued to be positive and significant, own region CP was negative and highly 
significant, and other region Corruption Perception was also negative and significant at 
the 10% level. Thus there appears to be a lot of interdependence in flows, not only within 
regions, but across regions. To explore this further, we split the sample into different 
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regions, so as to ask the following question: What is the effect of corruption perception 
in, for example, South Asia as a region, for any particular host country within South 
Asia? Further, what is the effect of CP in South America on any country within South 
Asia? To allow for this, we included the average CP for the South Asia region as an 
explanatory variable, in a sample restricted to the South Asian region. We also included 
South American CP as another additional explanatory variable in the regression for South 
Asia. Note that while in principle we could include the average CP in all the different 
regions in the sample, we include these additional variables one at a time due to the 
limited sample size. Indeed, results were more interesting when we did it this way. 
Naturally, for any particular country, the average CP in the South Asia region, includes 
the CP of all it’s South Asian neighbors, excluding itself, since by definition, no country 
is a neighbor to itself. The coefficient is negative and significant, thus there is a negative 
region effect. Countries such as India and China in South Asia are possibly competing 
with each other for FDI. However, including the average CP for other regions as well, 
such as South America, highlights another interesting result. From these latter results, it 
appears that South Asia competes “corruption-wise” with the African countries, South 
America and countries in the Middle East. However, lower corruption in East Asia does 
not significantly affect flows to South Asia.51Results for other sample regions are in some 
cases different. For example, South America exhibits a positive region effect. Lower 
perceived corruption in South America increases flows to the region in general. However, 
the region competes "corruption-wise" with other regions, especially African countries. 
 
                                                 
51 Not all results shown 
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Finally in Table 2.4, we isolate the effect of China's CP on all regions. In recent times, 
China has emerged as a growing destination for FDI, and it is perceived to be drawing 
FDI away from other countries. Our results indicate that this is indeed the case. Including 
China's CP in any region’s regression equation, (except East Asia, where it is 
insignificant), turns up the coefficient as significantly negative. Thus a lowering of 
perceived corruption in China does make China a more attractive FDI destination, 
drawing away investments from other areas. 
 
Table 2.5 presents a different specification for the results mentioned above, allowing us 
to use the entire sample more efficiently. Results are similar to those described above. 
 
This paper also tries to study if conditions relating to labor productivity in emerging 
market and developing economies are associated with competition in FDI inflows. The 
ideal measure that we would like to use would be a composite measure of cost of hiring 
labor, including the ease of hiring and firing workers, and worker output. We proxy for 
this by using the above defined measure of labor productivity, value added per person. 
The most interesting results for this case are associated with the South Asian region. 
Table 2.6 presents two specifications of this model. In (1), we use the entire sample, and 
include as additional explanatory variables, the labor productivity in the host country’s 
region, as well as average labor productivity in all other regions. The coefficients 
associated with these are significant, and perhaps surprisingly, positive. In general, an 
increase in worker productivity, is increasing FDI flows to developing market economies. 
However, turning specifically to the South Asian region, we find that countries in this 
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region compete with each other for FDI flows along this dimension, though they benefit 
in general from an increase in worker productivity in other regions. The coefficient on 
“own region” labor productivity is negative and significant, while on “other region” 
productivity is positive and significant. We tried substituting the East Asian and the 
South American region in place of “other region” and the results in both cases were 
positive and significant. 
 
Conducting a similar exercise for other regions did not yield the same results. In general, 
it appears to be true that developing economies benefit from increased worker 
productivity not only in their own region, but in other regions as well. 
 
The results mentioned so far are substantive, and robust to the inclusion of region 
dummies and various additional variables, such as inflation rates, budget deficits, literacy 
rates etc. The results that we present now are merely provided to encourage further study 
and data collection to answer questions that we posed at the beginning of the paper, such 
as, how does a perceived lowering of corruption in China affect India? Since the number 
of observations is small (only 16), we do not believe that the results are robust, and we do 
not provide them for any serious analysis. However, it is interesting to note that even 
with the very small sample size, some interesting findings that corroborate our earlier 
results emerge. We find that India loses out significantly when China gains along the 
corruption perception index. The coefficient on China CPI is negative and significant, 
while India’s own CPI is positive and significant. The adjusted- R2 is .8552 and the F-
statistic indicates that the R2 is significant. Surprisingly, doing a similar regression for 
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China yields the interesting result that a lessening of corruption in India, Malaysia or 
Thailand positively affects FDI flows to China. This is in line with results obtained by 
Hansen et al (2003), who find that China benefits greatly from investment flows to the 
region in general. Malaysia appears to be competing with countries like Thailand and 
Philippines, since a lowering of corruption in these countries appears to reduce FDI flows 
to it. Moving our focus to the South American region, Brazil competes for FDI with 
Argentina and Venezuela. However, in general, there is again a positive region effect, 
probably driven by other countries like Paraguay and Ecuador, who benefit from flows to 
the region. 
 
We also studied whether countries compete with each other along the index of labor 
productivity. For India and China, the effect of an increase in the other’s labor 
productivity is positive but not significant. An improvement in Malaysia’s productivity, 
however, significantly lowers flows to Indonesia. The effect of high labor productivity in 
Argentina is positive and significant on Brazil. 
 
While these latter set of results are extremely interesting, as we said before, they are 
hampered by the small sample sizes. This is an area of further study which we intend to 
explore using a larger panel, or using bilateral FDI flows. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Economic policies in developing countries have become increasingly focused on 
attracting FDI inflows. Interestingly, the academic literature has not clearly addressed the 
issue of whether developing countries are in reality competing or complementing each 
other in this effort.  
 
In our attempt at studying this topic, we focus on the effect of perceived corruption in 
developing economies on their ability to attract FDI inflows. We find quite convincingly 
that corruption perception does play a big role in investors’ decision of where to invest. 
The more corrupt a country is perceived to be, the less the flows of FDI to that country. 
An interesting new result that this study establishes is that corruption perception in other 
developing countries also affects flows to a particular host country. In general, treating all 
countries other than the host country as potential neighbors, a lowering of average 
corruption perception in the neighbor countries adversely affects flows to the host 
country.  Focusing more deeply on the relationships between individual countries within 
regions, we find, in particular, that countries within South Asia compete with each other 
for FDI, and also compete with most other regions, except East Asia. Countries in South 
America however benefit generally from flows to the region.  
 
To study the specific impact of the rise of China as an attractive FDI destination on other 
regions, we included China’s CPI as an additional explanatory variable for flows to 
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different regions. Interestingly, in most cases, China does have a large negative impact on 
FDI flows to other countries. 
 
We also made a preliminary attempt in this paper to study bilateral relationships between 
countries, though admittedly the sample size is too small to allow for any serious 
analysis. We found that less corruption in China significantly lowers investment in India. 
However, in general, China benefits greatly from investment flows to the region. 
Similarly, Malaysia competes for FDI with both Thailand and Philippines, while flows to 
countries like Paraguay and Ecuador complement flows to other countries in the region.  
We also derived similar results allowing the effect of neighbor’s labor productivity to 
affect FDI flows to a host country. Thus within each region, there is complementarity in 
flows as well as competition. 
 
In sum, our results clearly document that FDI inflows are highly interdependent. This 
makes it important for policy makers to take these effects into account when designing 
and identifying appropriate strategies for attracting FDI.  While this paper has not 
explained why these relationships may exist or why some bilateral relationships may be 
stronger than others, it is worth noting that some of these countries receive the bulk of 
their FDI from a common source. For example, on average, almost 60% of inward FDI to 
China, Malaysia and Thailand originates from no more than three sources. The US is one 
of the three biggest investors in both China and India, as well as the Latin American 
countries. Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia share Japan as a key source of FDI.  
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Based on these results, we suggest the possibility that developing economies could 
increase their inward FDI dramatically, if they could improve the business climate for 
investors, not just in absolute, but in relative terms. 
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Appendix 
2.A.1 Data Sources and Definitions 
 
FDI Inflows: Millions of Dollars 
Source: UNCTAD 
Availability: 1980-2003 
 
Other variables: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
VALADDPP: Value Added Per Person Employed (1980=100) 
TRADEGDP: (Imports+Exports)/GDP 
 
Corruption Perception Index: 
The Transparency International (TI) Corruption Index is an initiative taken by the 
Berlin-based international non-governmental organization, TI, together with Dr Johann 
Graf Lambsdorff, an economist with the University of Goettingen. The index is a “poll of 
polls”, representing the average scores which individual countries have been given by 
international businessmen and financial journalists when polled in a variety of contexts. 
A ten equals an entirely clean country while zero equals a country where business 
transactions are entirely dominated by kickbacks, extortion etc. The data are available for 
the years 1980-1985, 1988-1992, 1995-2000. 
 
Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson (2004). Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 
Annual Report. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from 
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www.freetheworld.com. Obtained data on Maximum Marginal Income Tax rate, Capital 
Controls. Higher ratings are for countries with lower taxes. The IMF reports on 13 
different types of capital controls. This component is based on the number of capital 
controls levied. The zero-to-10 rating is constructed by taking 13 minus the number of 
capital controls divided by 13 and multiplied by 10. Hence low ratings are for countries 
with most capital controls. 
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Appendix 2.A.2 
List of Countries Used in Sample By Region (Own Classification) 
 
South Asia       
• India, China, Hong Kong, Pakistan  
 
East Asia 
• Indonesia, Philippines , Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia  
 
Africa 
• Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria , Senegal, Angola 
 
South America 
• Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Ecuador 
 
Mid-East 
• Qatar, Lebanon, Turkey, Poland (also included here) 
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Appendix 2.A.3 
Variation in Corruption Perception Index Across Countries 
Variation in 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Across 
Countries 
 
China India Indonesia Argentina Singapore 
1980-85 5.13 3.67 0.2 4.94 8.41 
1988-1992 4.73 2.89 0.57 5.91 9.16 
1995 2.16 2.78 1.94 5.24 9.26 
1996 2.43 2.63 2.65 3.41 8.8 
1997 2.88 2.75 2.72 2.81 8.66 
1998 3.5 2.9 2 3 9.1 
1999 3.4 2.9 1.7 3 9.1 
2000 3.1 2.8 1.7 3.5 9.1 
Note: Higher Scores represent less Corruption 
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Figure 2.1: Regional FDI Inflows 
 
 
Fig 2.1A: Across Region Flows 
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Fig 2.1B: Within Region Flows 
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Table 2.1 
Sample Summary Statistics 
 No. of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev 
FDI Inflow ($ 
million) 
South Asia 
East Asia 
South America 
Africa 
 
 
136 
170 
272 
204 
 
 
5608.55 
1844.67 
1766.26 
437.73 
 
 
12848.75 
3128.64 
4675.74 
745.62 
 
CP 
South Asia 
East Asia 
South America 
Africa 
 
 
67 
97 
110 
69 
 
3.78 
3.87 
2.96 
3.13 
 
1.89 
2.81 
1.13 
2.25 
GDP Growth 
South Asia 
East Asia 
South America 
Africa 
 
 
83 
103 
166 
124 
 
6.61 
5.68 
2.18 
2.81 
 
3.37 
4.64 
4.53 
4.98 
Value Added Per 
Person 
South Asia 
East Asia 
South America 
 
 
 
79 
100 
80 
 
 
 
147.63 
129.44 
89.02 
 
 
 
34.14 
41.63 
9.17 
Trade/GDP 
South Asia 
East Asia 
South America 
Africa 
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100 
166 
115 
 
80.53 
134.80 
42.67 
60.24 
 
94.20 
116.20 
15.57 
19.58 
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Table 2.2 
Regression Results:  
Random Effects GLS 
 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,*significant at 10% 
Note: Specification 5 assigns a positive (distance) weight only to neighbor countries within the same region 
as the host country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log (FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI Inflow) 
Independent 
variables 
     
Log(GDP 
Growth) 
.286*** 
(.102) 
.278*** 
(.102) 
.270*** 
(.100) 
.227*** 
(.090) 
.280*** 
(.118) 
Log (GDP) 1.52*** 
(.200) 
1.60*** 
(.208) 
1.84*** 
(.226) 
1.41*** 
(.228) 
1.21*** 
(.238) 
Value Added 
Per Person 
.005 
(.003) 
.004 
(.003) 
.001 
(.004) 
.001 
(.003) 
.009*** 
(.004) 
Trade/GDP .007*** 
(.002) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
7.02e+08 
(5.38e+08) 
Low Tax Rate    .084** 
(.041) 
 
Fewer Cap. 
Controls 
   .173*** 
(.044) 
 
Telephone 
lines 
.013 
(.228) 
.012 
(.028) 
-.002 
(.029) 
-.037 
(.027) 
-.018 
(.017) 
CP .134* 
(.081) 
.127 
(.082) 
.109 
(.082) 
.046 
(.077) 
.227** 
(.089) 
AVGCP  -.140 
(.291) 
   
GDPWTCP   -.155* 
(.086) 
-.124* 
(.080) 
 
DISTWTCP     -.356*** 
(.116) 
Region 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
No. Of 
Observations 
185 159 159 154 124 
Overall R-
square 
.5211 .4804 .4043 .4541 .4742 
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Table 2.3 
Interdependence in Flows 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI 
Flow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Sample All 
Regions 
South Asia South Asia South 
America 
South 
America 
East Asia 
Independent 
variables 
      
Log(GDP 
Growth) 
.290** 
(.118) 
.757*** 
(.186) 
.702*** 
(.183) 
.167 
(.158) 
.210 
(.171) 
.340** 
(.143) 
Log(GDP) .741*** 
(.115) 
-.053 
(.185) 
.016 
(.171) 
.850*** 
(.189) 
.996 
(.198) 
1.53*** 
(.209) 
Value 
Added Per 
Person 
.013*** 
(.003) 
.045*** 
(.007) 
.048*** 
(.007) 
.007 
(.039) 
.002 
(.042) 
 
.002 
(.003) 
Trade/GDP .005*** 
(.001) 
-.003 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.004) 
.004 
(.015) 
.019 
(.015) 
.0008 
(.001) 
Telephone 
Lines 
.029 
(.035) 
-.209 
(.081) 
-.246*** 
(.081) 
-.017 
(.069) 
.071 
(.057) 
.002 
(.040) 
CP .131* 
(.068) 
.599*** 
(.144) 
.624*** 
(.143) 
-.015 
(.198) 
-.169 
(.198) 
.499*** 
(.087) 
Own Region 
Average CP 
-.375*** 
(.119) 
  1.23*** 
(.479) 
 -.391 
(.351) 
Other 
Region 
Average CP 
-.388* 
(.234) 
  -1.96*** 
(.745) 
 -.048 
(.271) 
South Asia 
CP 
 -.413** 
(.204) 
-.205 
(.168) 
   
South 
America CP 
 -1.09*** 
(.377) 
  1.25* 
(.675) 
 
Africa CP   -.615*** 
(.191) 
 -.660* 
(.405) 
 
Region 
Dummies 
Yes - -  -  
No. of 
Observations 
151 57 57 30 30 64 
Overall R-
square 
.7013 .8660 .8705 .8441 .8532 .8320 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,*significant at 10% 
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Table 2.4 
Impact of China CP on FDI Flows 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log (FDI 
Flow) 
Sample All 
Regions 
South Asia South 
America 
East Asia 
Independent 
variables 
    
Log(GDP 
Growth) 
.248** 
(.101) 
.476** 
(.179) 
.237 
(.167) 
.335** 
(.141) 
Log(GDP) 1.25*** 
(.203) 
.306*** 
(.154) 
.827*** 
(.208) 
1.47*** 
(.237) 
Value 
Added Per 
Person 
.002 
(.003) 
.024*** 
(.008) 
.004 
(.041) 
.002 
(.003) 
Trade/GDP .007*** 
(.002) 
.016*** 
(.005) 
.001 
(.018) 
.0007 
(.001) 
Telephone 
Lines 
-.001 
(.035) 
-.289 
(.007) 
-.002 
(.078) 
.003 
(.039) 
CP .120 
(.088) 
.010 
(.179) 
-.115 
(.199) 
.439*** 
(.154) 
Own Region 
Average CP 
-.326*** 
(.086) 
-.165 
(.152) 
.787 
(.420) 
-.634 
(.621) 
China CP -.204*** 
(.093) 
-.393*** 
(.089) 
-.435** 
(.218) 
-.136 
(.270) 
No. of 
Observations 
151 55 30 64 
Overall R-
square 
.4540 .8905 .8255 .8327 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,*significant at 10% 
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Table 2.5 
Interdependence in Flows: Alternative 
Specification 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Sample All Regions All Regions; 
Other 
Region=China 
Independent 
variables 
  
Log(GDP 
Growth) 
.208*** 
(.070) 
.257*** 
(.071) 
Log(GDP) 1.26*** 
(.110) 
1.15*** 
(.110) 
Trade/GDP .006*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.001) 
Telephone Lines -.009 
(.027) 
.004 
(.024) 
CP .037 
(.062) 
-.044 
(.062) 
S.Asia*Own Reg 
CP 
-.692*** 
(.088) 
-.547*** 
(.108) 
S.Am*Own Reg 
CP 
1.15*** 
(.193) 
.691*** 
(.153) 
E.Asia*Own Reg 
CP 
-.346** 
(.161) 
-.116 
(.117) 
Africa*Own Reg 
CP 
.339 
(.219) 
.184 
(.187) 
S.Asia*Oth Reg 
CP 
-.682*** 
(.211) 
-.044 
(.130) 
S.Am*Oth Reg 
CP 
 
-1.42*** 
(.277) 
-.403*** 
(.089) 
E.Asia* Oth Reg 
CP 
-.643*** 
(.206) 
-.210** 
(.088) 
Africa*Oth Reg 
CP 
-1.06*** 
(.282) 
-.346*** 
(.118) 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,*significant at 10% 
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Table 2.6 
Impact of Labor Productivity on FDI Flows 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Log(FDI 
Inflow) 
Sample All Regions South Asia 
Independent 
variables 
  
Log(GDPGrowth) .208** 
(.093) 
.705*** 
(.206) 
Log(GDP) .522** 
(.214) 
.236 
(.183) 
Value Added per 
Person 
(Valaddpp) 
.006 
(.004) 
.047*** 
(.009) 
Trade/GDP .004** 
(.002) 
.003 
(.004) 
Telephone Lines -.086*** 
(.031) 
-.224*** 
(.084) 
CP .094 
(.076) 
.542*** 
(.141) 
Own Region 
Valadpp 
.009** 
(.004) 
-.028* 
(.016) 
Other Region 
Valaddpp 
.048*** 
(.007) 
.118** 
(.048) 
No Of 
Observations 
151 57 
Overall R-Square .5657 .8597 
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